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                    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                      FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
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       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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                                        Case No:
                                       11-CR-512 (DRD)
                          Plaintiff, )
 4
                                        SENTENCING
       VS.
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                                        HEARING
       FRANK PEAKE,
 6
                          Defendant. )
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                     TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING HEARING
                                HELD BEFORE
 9
                 THE HONORABLE JUDGE DANIEL R. DOMINGUEZ
                         Friday, December 6, 2013
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                          APPEARANCES
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       For the Plaintiff:
14
                Mr. Brent Snyder, Esq.
                Mr. Craig Y. Lee, Esq.
15
                Ms. Heather Tewksbury, Esq.
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       For the Defendant:
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                Mr. David O. Markus, Esq.
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                Ms. A. Margot Moss, Esq.
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1 (WHEREUPON, commencing at 10:27 a.m., the following proceedings were had in open court, to wit:) 2 3 THE COURT: Good morning to all. For the ladies and gentlemen relating to the case 4 5 of Mr. Peake, the case of Mr. Peake is a sentencing after a trial. 6 7 These two first sentences are plea agreements. So 8 the sentence of Mr. Peake will normally take a longer time 9 and more effort of the Court, so I don't expect to start 10 that case until 11:30. So if you want to take a brief 11 coffee, Cuatro Sombras on the corner over there is a good 12 place to go. There are other nice Puerto Rican coffee 13 places that you can all go. 14 MR. SNYDER: Thank you, Your Honor. 15 MR. MARKUS: Thank you. 16 THE COURT: And, anyway, I had to read 140 or more 17 pages yesterday. We normally restrict them to 30, but I 18 didn't have the opportunity to advise you that we consider 19 after 30 pages extra baggage, but the Court read all 140 20 Thank you. pages. 21 MR. MARKUS: Thank you, Your Honor. 2.2 THE COURT: So the Court is well briefed on that, 23 but it is going to take the Court some time to discuss that matter with both of you. Thank you. 24 25 So I suggest that you take a break while I handle

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       these other cases that constitute plea agreements.
                 (WHEREUPON, a recess was had from 10:29 a.m. to
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       12:33 p.m.)
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                 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Criminal case 11-512,
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       United States of America vs. Frank Peake.
                 THE COURT: Okay. First, the Court has amended
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       the opinion and order on the Rule 29 to add certain facts
       that I think were pertinent and are to be examined under the
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 9
       standard of in the light most favorable to the government,
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       which is not my standard for sentencing, but is my standard
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       for Rule 29. So please provide three copies to the defense
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       and two copies to the United States.
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                 Second, I think that the duration of this matter
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       is not going to be five minutes. In fact, I don't think it
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       is going to be one hour, so I think we ought to go take
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       lunch and come back.
                 If that alters anybody's plane -- does that alter
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18
       your plane?
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                 MR. MARKUS: Your Honor, we have a flight that
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       leaves at 6:00.
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                 THE COURT: Oh, no. We will be out of here way
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       before 4:00.
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                 MR. MARKUS: I don't know how long sentencing is
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       going to take. I have spoken to the prosecutor, and I think
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       we have a PowerPoint presentation and they have --
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1 THE COURT: I know. I will accept the PowerPoint, 2 I looked at it, and I am not going to go back on my 3 representation to you that he would be allowed bail on 4 appeal. 5 MR. MARKUS: And we have spoken about that as 6 well, and I think we have an agreement in light of the 7 Court's comments on that to allow bail pending appeal. 8 Maybe we can --9 THE COURT: I want you to understand that I think 10 it is a courtesy, because I understand that I have an 11 otherwise extremely decent person before me, all right, 12 other than this conduct. And I know he's not a danger to 13 the community because he's not going to be in the field any 14 more. 15 But whether or not this has issues on appeal that 16 I warrant that are close, I don't necessarily feel that way 17 now that I have examined the evidence coolly and having the 18 benefit of the record and my notes and the two briefs. 19 But, anyway, I am not going to change my mind as 20 to the right that he could develop an argument that may 21 persuade the Court, that's another matter. Whether I think 2.2 it is going to fly -- the standard is that I think it is 23 going to fly. That's the standard.

But, anyway, the Court is not going to change its mind. That was the representation made, and that's it. But

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1 should he not prevail on appeal, that will be another 2 matter. 3 MR. MARKUS: Of course, Your Honor. Can I have a 4 moment to speak with Mr. Snyder about --5 THE COURT: Yes. (Short pause while counsels conferred.) 6 7 MR. MARKUS: Your Honor, I think there are two components to the sentencing; one is the objections to the 8 9 pre-sentence investigation report, and then 3553 factors. 10 THE COURT: Yes. 11 MR. MARKUS: Perhaps we could just deal with the 12 objections to the pre-sentence investigation report and see 13 where we are, and if that goes quickly, maybe we could get 14 the sentencing done before lunch, and, if not, maybe we 15 could take a break? 16 THE COURT: The problem is that these ladies and gentlemen have been here since 9:00. That's the problem, 17 18 all right. And I have no problem. I am going to have lunch 19 here with a sandwich. I am not leaving. It is my personnel 20 that is here, that I think they ought to take lunch. 21 Now, you are not going to miss your plane, all 2.2 right? 23 MR. MARKUS: All right. Thank you. 24 THE COURT: And I think we can move quickly 25 through some matters. But I have no control over this.

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       This is your control.
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                 MR. MARKUS: I know. And I don't think that's
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      going to take you long, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: No, no. Fine. No problem. I am
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      going to allow it because I saw some of this already in your
      brief.
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 7
                 MR. MARKUS: There's no hotel rooms in Puerto Rico
       tonight, so if I miss the flight, Ms. Moss and I have to
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 9
       stay with you tonight, Judge.
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                 THE COURT: Fine. I will take you. It will be
       after the sentence. I don't know if you may want to be
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12
      there. You may not want to be there. I don't know. Where
      are we going to put the lady?
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                 MR. MARKUS: I don't know, Judge. I don't know.
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                 THE COURT: All right. Let's go. 1:30 on the
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      dot.
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                 (WHEREUPON, a recess was had from 12:38 p.m. to
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       1:49 p.m.)
                 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Criminal 11-512, United
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      States of America vs. Frank Peake. Case called for
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       sentencing hearing.
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                 Appearing on behalf of the government, attorneys
      Brent Snyder, Craig Lee, Heather Tewksbury.
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24
                 Appearing on behalf of defendant, attorney Margot
25
      Moss and attorney David Markus.
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1 THE COURT: I realize we haven't made the best of 2 interpretations relating to your names. Please excuse us. 3 All right. 4 MR. SNYDER: I think at times, Your Honor, I have 5 been far more quilty of that in interpreting names than anybody here has. 6 7 THE COURT: That's fine. But the vernacular here is not English, so please excuse us in the pronunciation. I 8 9 think we can handle English from the books, but not 10 otherwise. 11 Who is going to speak first? 12 MR. SNYDER: I assume since it's the United States' sentencing, I would be happy to speak first, 13 14 Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Go right ahead. Now, please presume 16 that I have read all the briefs, both of you. Please do. 17 If you don't, I will give them to you underlined at the end, 18 all right. So please do. 19 Go ahead. 20 MR. SNYDER: Well, Your Honor, first, I will say 21 that I can probably speak for both of us in apologizing if 2.2 we overwhelmed Your Honor with paper. We recognize that some of the intricacies of antitrust sentencings aren't 23 24 always something that judges have confronted on a day-to-day 25 basis like some other types of sentencings.

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Really, I just have a few basic points I want to make that I think really probably cover both issues related to the PSR and then also sentencing. THE COURT: You know what he is going to object to in the PSR. MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Why don't you address those points. MR. SNYDER: Okay. Undeniably, this was an egregious and harmful conspiracy, and I don't think it is anything that I really need to belabor here today. The Court, having handled the entire MDL related to this conspiracy, I think is very well aware of kind of the breadth and scope of the conspiracy and all the types of companies that were affected by the conspiracy. The really salient issue that I think goes to both the PSR and to the sentencing is that this was a massive volume of commerce that was affected by the conduct that's at issue here in this case. And that volume of commerce is the key sentencing criteria when you apply the quidelines under 2R1.1. And there's --THE COURT: I have to clarify that I have verified that the guideline in 2007 is equal to the guideline in

THE COURT: I have to clarify that I have verified that the guideline in 2007 is equal to the guideline in 2013. And since there was conduct in 2007, there is a guideline that says that I must use the guideline that was applicable during the last part of the conspiracy.

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In other words, should there be an overlapping between two guidelines, the guideline says that the Court may use and should use the guideline that covers the last part of the conspiracy. Go ahead.

MR. SNYDER: And the United States agrees with that interpretation, Your Honor, and would only note with respect to that guideline, that was a guideline that was enhanced, actually, in about 2004 to extend --

THE COURT: So if it was handled in 2004, then since you have requested that we use the year 2005 and not 2003, so that's the appropriate guideline.

MR. SNYDER: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SNYDER: And the key sentencing criteria under that guideline is the volume of affected commerce. And in this case, as in all antitrust cases, there is a presumption that all sales of the price fixed product or service that occurred during the defendant's participation were affected by the conspiracy. And that is a presumption that Mr. Peake has been unable to rebut.

And I think I can focus on just a single example that hopefully makes the point clear, and that is the bunker fuel surcharge. The bunker fuel surcharge was undeniably fixed. There was a lot of testimony and documentary evidence about the bunker fuel surcharge during the course

of the trial.

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And the bunker fuel surcharge would go up and down numerous times during the course of each year that was affected by the conspiracy. And as a result -- and that bunker fuel surcharge applied to every single container of freight that was shipped between the United States and Puerto Rico.

So looking at just that one single component of the rate that was charged to customers, it shows the conspiracy affected all freight that was shipped back and forth. And that was applied to contracts not yet in existence when Mr. Peake joined the conspiracy, contracts that were already in existence when he joined the conspiracy. Because even if the contract had run halfway through its term, the bunker fuel surcharge was still being fixed on a more periodic basis during the life of those contracts.

So there's been testimony, and I think the Court added it to its order this morning about all the components of the rates were affected by the conspiracy, and Mr. Baci testified at trial that the price increases in those components during the course of the conspiracy was 90 plus percent attributable to the conspiracy.

Now, as a result of the fact that this case involves such large volumes of affected commerce, the

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investigation has produced several of the longest sentences ever imposed for antitrust defenses. And that includes Peter Baci, who was Mr. Peake's subordinate, who received what at that time was the longest sentence for an antitrust defense. There has been since somebody else sentenced to the same amount of time.

And Mr. Baci received that sentence even though he almost immediately accepted responsibility and began to substantially cooperate with the Government's investigation.

So based on that --

THE COURT: I think I made this expression before, and I did it in the last letter that I received from the juror, from the foreperson, and that is that we cannot take Baci naked. We have to take Baci with the extra baggage that he earned. In other words, he earned 3 points, which the defendant is not entitled to, and he earned the 5K1.1 substantial assistance.

Now, there's no guideline for a 5K. That's a discretional matter. But a 5K, to use an example, is more than a safety valve. Because a safety valve is merely stating the truth. It is not cooperating. And a safety valve is 2 additional points.

So I think we should add 3 and 3 points, if we are only going to use the guidelines. But we're not. We're not. Because I want to hear the whole spectrum, not just

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the guidelines, all right. But we cannot take Baci and say Baci got 48, therefore, he shouldn't get more than 48. The problem is that Baci cooperated, and Baci also timely accepted responsibility and did not expose the Government to having to prove its case.

MR. SNYDER: That's correct, Your Honor. And the same basic facts apply to each of the other people that had been prosecuted in this investigation.

THE COURT: For that I cite the case of Brother

Perez-Gimenez that was confirmed, and that is, I have faced

that matter here in federal court many times, when we have

conspirators that because a person pled guilty, they want to

have the same sentence as the person that accepted

responsibility, the conspirator that went to trial versus

the person that accepts responsibility or cooperates. And

that's the case of US vs. Rodriguez Lozada, which was from

Judge Perez-Gimenez, which has been cited many times, which

is at 558 F.3d 29 at page 45:

"In addition, as the district court noted, Richard and the other coconspirators pled guilty, pursuant to plea agreements that addressed their roles under United States Guideline 3B1.1. Given the material difference between the defendants who pled guilty pursuant to plea agreements and Rivera, who did not, no disparity in sentencing occurred in this case that would amount to an abuse of discretion."

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And here there is the added baggage that these gentlemen cooperated. So now I wanted to make a comment.

Because this Court -- you just said that I participated in the civil case. And I want to make the comment of Isaac Camacho vs. Autoridad De Telefonos, which is at 868 F.2d.

This is a case where I was a lawyer. And Judge

Perez-Gimenez had acted in a criminal capacity, and then he had a civil case, and they alleged that because the judge participated in a civil or a criminal case, he cannot take the case after.

And Isaac Camacho, which is at 868 F.2d, at page 482, going to page 490, it is an opinion authored by Judge Selya. If you look closely, you will find that I was one of the lawyers representing the authority persons. And the issue here was that Judge Perez had handled the criminal case in its entirety as far as providing and authorizing all the Title IIIs. All of them. So he saw all that evidence ex parte. Not in court. Ex parte.

And in comes the civil case where the *Macheteros*, who were the gentlemen who were found guilty of putting the bombs on the National Guard airplanes, and also who attacked in Connecticut the stagecoach, the electronic stagecoach, let's put it that way, and these gentlemen then attacked the Title IIIs in the civil case, alleging that because in Puerto Rico, we cannot make another constitution, of

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wiretapping, that, therefore, since we were in Puerto Rico, that we could not wiretap under Title III.

And they filed a case against the company that authorized the wiretap, and, of course, as you can imagine, that was not a very difficult case for the First Circuit on the merits, because that's preempted. And the state cannot preempt a federal law.

But the main point of the case is on the recusal of Judge Perez because he had seen the criminal, and then he had seen the criminal ex parte. All of them. Even assuming all of them. The First Circuit Court stated that the participation in both civil and criminal was not a reason to recuse.

I also want to clarify the following. The case of the civil case that was assigned to the Court was not because I asked for it. This was a case that was assigned to the Court by the multidistrict litigation. I did not request this case, the civil case. Neither did I request the criminal case. The criminal case was assigned by the chief to me because of procedural efficiency in handling this case. That's all. And because of that, that case was assigned by the chief. I didn't ask for it either.

So I want to clarify that, because I want the record to be clear on those two aspects because you mentioned that this Court saw the civil case. Yes, I saw

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the civil case, but it was an assigned case from the multidistrict litigation. It wasn't assigned to the district, it was assigned to me from the MDL litigation.

All right. Go ahead.

MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

Based on the volume of commerce and the sentences that Mr. Peake's coconspirators received, he's potentially facing a very significant sentence, and in the Government's -- and, obviously, the Government's recommendation shows that the Government believes that he deserves it. But the Government also recognizes that this Court has considerable discretion in deciding what Mr. Peake's sentence should be. And it is that that I really want to address myself to for my remaining remarks today. As the probation officer concluded, in looking at both the guidelines and equitable issues, there are no factors, there are no guidelines or equitable factors that warrant the Court's exercise of discretion to significantly depart from the guidelines.

And I just quickly want to address a number of potential things that the Court could be considering. You know, the first is that a departure isn't warranted because of the fact that Mr. Peake's subordinate Peter Baci handled the day-to-day operations and details of the conspiracy. That's what bosses do. They delegate, and they oversee

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other people who did the real work of either legitimate work or illegitimate work in the case of conspiracy. That is really the main point that I think needs to be considered in connection with the leader/organizer enhancement under the guidelines.

It is not a defense that Mr. Peake let Mr. Baci do more of the dirty work. That doesn't make him less culpable, and it doesn't make him less worthy of punishment. In fact, he benefited by a lot of that work that was done by Mr. Baci because he was the person who was getting the largest bonuses when Sea Star line made profits when their profits went up.

THE COURT: Brother counsel disagrees with you, so let me hear the figures.

MR. SNYDER: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Brother counsel on the other side disagrees with you. He says that, in fact, he received less salary every year. He says a 5 percent cut in his salary every year. That's what he says.

MR. SNYDER: I think if you look at his total compensation, in some years the bonuses — there were some years where bonuses were a little higher and some years they were a little lower. But Sea Star would only pay bonuses if the company was making a profit. And Sea Star in its entire history only ever made a profit during the conspiracy. In

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addition to that, even if Mr. Peake's bonuses were a little higher or a little lower in certain years, I believe the evidentiary record shows that his were the highest being paid in the company.

And so he was always benefiting -- when Sea Star was profitable as a result of the conspiracy, and bonuses were paid, he was always benefiting more than anybody else at the company was, including Mr. Baci.

Mr. Peake knew, participated, oversaw and, most importantly, could have stopped the conspiracy, but he didn't. And that's precisely why he should receive the leader/organizer bump under the guidelines.

It would be unfair for Mr. Peake to obtain the benefit and then let Mr. Baci take the fall. You know, he went to trial, which it was his right, but it would be unfair for him now to say, "Well, Peter Baci did more of the dirty work, and even though he cooperated, I should get a more attractive sentence than he did." That would essentially be letting Mr. Baci take the fall for something Mr. Peake at all times as Mr. Baci's boss could have put a stop to.

This case is really no different than a drug cartel case. The cartel leader is not less culpable just because it was somebody else that actually physically smuggled the drugs.

THE COURT: Or killed the persons.

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MR. SNYDER: Or killed the persons.

He's more responsible because he was the leader, and he could have stopped the conduct. And that's the same thing that applies to Mr. Peake here.

Another more general argument that you have already touched on is that a departure isn't warranted merely because Mr. Peake's coconspirators got lower sentences.

The case law is very clear on this, and the Court already touched on this issue in the order that you issued yesterday with respect to the juror letter. As you noted, the other individuals that have already pled guilty in this case got lower sentences because they accepted responsibility and they cooperated and Mr. Peake didn't.

Mr. Peake had all the same opportunities to plead and cooperate at the outset, but he chose not to. He doesn't now get to take advantage of their decision to cooperate in order to get a lower sentence. He can't free ride on their acceptance and cooperation. That wouldn't be fair to them. Had he made the same decision as they did at the outset, he would have been treated similarly to them. But he chose not to.

The other argument I think that's clear from Mr. Peake's briefing as well as his PowerPoint is that he

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       intends to point to sentences given to other antitrust
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       offenders in different investigations.
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                 Well, the treatment of offenders in completely
       different antitrust cases doesn't warrant a departure in
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       this case. The cases hold that only similarly situated
       defendants should be compared, and it needs to be an apples
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       to apples comparison --
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                 THE COURT: Let me ask you this: When did the
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       quideline change?
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                 MR. SNYDER: I believe it was in 2004, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: 2004. So, therefore, examples prior
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       to 2004 do not help us.
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                 MR. SNYDER: That is correct, although I will note
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       for the record --
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                 THE COURT: That he has recent ones, yes, I know.
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                 MR. SNYDER: He has the more than recent ones.
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       But you are correct, Your Honor, the earlier examples are
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       not applicable because, one, many of them wouldn't have
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       involved convicted defendants, and, two, wouldn't involve,
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       you know, convictions post the new enhanced guidelines.
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                 So the comparison really needs to be an apples to
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       apples comparison, not apples to oranges comparison. By
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       that I mean, in a drug cartel case, a kilo in San Juan is a
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       kilo of cocaine in San Francisco.
25
                 But an LCD conspiracy -- and that would make that
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an apples to apple comparison. But an LCD conspiracy in Taiwan is not the same as an auto parts conspiracy in Japan, which isn't the same as a vitamins conspiracy in Europe, which isn't the same as a coastal freight conspiracy in the United States and here in Puerto Rico. They are not apples to apples comparisons. And there's reasons for that.

They are different industries, different numbers of participants, very important, different extradition issues that require us to offer sentences that will cause people to voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the United States if they are in a country that we can't extradite from, which was the case with the LCD defendants.

Different needs for cooperation, which can vary throughout different investigations. In this investigation, we had those Gmails in our possession before any of these defendants ever knew that they were under investigation.

That created a very different need or much less of a need for cooperation than in a foreign investigation where we don't have access to documents, people, or any sort of covert surveillance opportunities. And that distinguishes a lot of the cases that Mr. Markus will shortly stand up here and rely on.

Those differences lead to different sentences in those investigations and make them inapt comparisons to this investigation. They also don't warrant departure here,

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especially because they would result in Mr. Peake getting lesser sentences than his own coconspirators, who accepted responsibility immediately and cooperated beginning in 2008.

For instance, in the AUO case, the most senior level executives who were convicted received 36-month sentences. And a more -- less culpable, a more mid-level executive who was convicted at trial received 24 months. But what Mr. Markus' entire point doesn't address is how those sentences compared to all of the pleading and cooperating coconspirators. Those coconspirators all received sentences that were substantially less than the people who were convicted at trial.

So the mid-level executive who received 24 months still received a sentence that was almost double the CEO of one of the major participating corporations who pled guilty, went to prison, and accepted responsibility. Undeniably, the CEO of one of the participating companies, who paid a multi-hundred million dollar fine, was more culpable than a mid-level executive at AUO. But yet that mid-level executive at AUO didn't accept responsibility, didn't cooperate, and received a sentence that was almost double that of the pleading and cooperating CEO.

Finally, Mr. Peake's personal characteristics don't warrant a departure in this case. Mr. Peake claims to be a man of integrity, a good family man, and respected in

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this community. But almost all white collar offenders can say the same thing. That doesn't warrant leniency. If anything, that makes them even less worthy of sympathy or leniency. They have all the advantages: Power, wealth, respect, and public trust, yet they choose to abuse those things. They act out of greed, not need. They misuse their power and influence for personal benefit. That doesn't merit leniency. A man of integrity would not have done to Puerto Rico for years that Mr. Peake did and allowed to be done.

So as the probation officer concluded, there's simply no grounds that warrant a departure in this case. Having said that, the Government recognizes that an 87-month sentence, which is the guideline sentence, is severe. But so is the crime. However, the Government does understand that the Court may conclude that an 87-month sentence is too severe for this case.

But even if so, the Government believes that a sentence is necessary in this case that is longer than Mr. Peake's coconspirators received, because any other result gives him the benefit of the acceptance of responsibility and cooperation that they earned and he didn't. And that would create a disservice, and it would be a disincentive to cooperation for other people if they know they can hold out, go to trial, and then free ride on the

cooperation of people who plead before them.

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THE COURT: That is a big problem.

MR. SNYDER: This case is not about imposing the longest sentence of all time. It isn't. That's not why the Government is standing here and requesting this sentence. It is about treating Frank Peake consistent with how his coconspirators were treated. Who, by virtue of the volume of commerce, the severity of the conduct in this case, received some of the longest sentences that have ever been imposed, even though they cooperated quickly, and they pled guilty quickly, and substantially cooperated. True unfairness and disservice would be to treat Frank Peake better than his coconspirators by giving him the benefit of their acceptance of responsibility and substantial cooperation that they earned and he didn't.

THE COURT: Before you leave, I would like to go through the numbers on the points that are attributed under leadership. First, I have no doubt that he led or organized at least one participant. He doesn't have to lead all of them, one participant is enough, and he lead at least two, which is Chisholm and Baci. But that doesn't do the trick by itself. We need others.

And I wanted to know of these factors that I am going to read to you, under US vs. Appolon, 695 F.3d 44, 2012, at page 70, factors that are relevant in determining

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       the supervisory nature of a defendant's role.
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       supervisory nature.
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                 One, the exercise of decision making authority.
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       imagine that that is relating to the conspiracy. I think
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       that criteria has been met; that is, that Baci definitely
       followed, when he had to intervene, Baci could not turn it
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 7
       back.
                 MR. SNYDER: That's correct.
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                 THE COURT: Baci could not turn it back. And,
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       further, there were times when he was acting on himself
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       precisely because there was no agreement.
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                 The second one is the nature of the participation
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       in the commission of the offense. I think that's also met.
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       What's your opinion as to that?
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                 MR. SNYDER: We would agree, Your Honor. He
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       played a leadership role. His role was not to be the
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       hands-on, day-to-day person, but when issues would arise
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       that needed to be solved or quidance needed to be given, or
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       the conspiracy needed to be put back on track with Horizon,
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       that's when Mr. Peake would get involved and work to get
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       things on track.
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                 THE COURT: Third is the recruitment of
23
       accomplices. I don't think he recruited anybody.
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                 MR. SNYDER: We agree with that, Your Honor.
25
                 THE COURT: And the fourth -- these are not
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1 numerous clausus factors, these are numerous apertus 2 factors. In other words, this is not the end of the 3 potential factors. 4 But the next one is the claim right to a larger 5 share of the fruits of the crime. What is your position 6 relating to that? 7 MR. SNYDER: That with respect to the bonuses that he received from Sea Star, he received -- those bonuses were 8 9 the result of profits, the ill-gotten gains of the 10 conspiracy, and that as the president of the company, he did 11 receive larger bonuses than other people in his company did. 12 THE COURT: A fifth element provided -- the fifth criteria, not the element. The fifth criteria was the 13 14 degree of participation in planning or organizing the 15 offense. 16 MR. SNYDER: His role was that of a leader. 17 Undoubtedly, he played less of a role on a day-to-day basis 18 than Mr. Baci or Mr. Glova did. The same thing would also 19 be true, however, of Mr. Serra, who did receive a four 20 leader organizer bump in connection with his plea. 21 THE COURT: The sixth -- I am going to ask the 2.2 defendant, also, what his position is. The sixth --23 MR. MARKUS: I will have an answer for you. 24 THE COURT: The nature and scope of the illegal 25 activity.

1 MR. SNYDER: It was extensive, Your Honor. THE COURT: I think I categorized it as extensive 2 3 and persuasive in the sense that it covered, pursuant to 4 some testimony, it covered up to 85 percent. 5 MR. SNYDER: Correct. This was not a one overt act conspiracy that Mr. Peake just had awareness of as the 6 7 boss of the company. This was obviously a conspiracy that 8 went on for a lengthy period of time, and although Mr. Peake 9 was not there in those first months that it was organized, 10 he came in shortly thereafter, and the evidence at trial 11 established that he very quickly thereafter become involved 12 and continued to be involved throughout the remaining number of years that the conspiracy remained in effect. 13 14 THE COURT: And the seventh criteria is the degree 15 of control and authority exercised of others. 16 MR. SNYDER: He was the president of the company. 17 THE COURT: He at least had control over two 18 persons, and I recall that he was able to persuade at least 19 another as to applying the same bunker fuel to the longer 20 routes. 21 So that you may know where the Court got this, 2.2 this is commentary note number 4 to United States Guideline 23 3B1.1. 24 The other matter that I wanted to discuss with you 25 a little bit more thoroughly than you covered was how did

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you get to the $500 million figure, which runs all the way
up to $1 billion. There's no change. It receives the same
points whether it is 500 or whether it is $999,000 million.
         MR. SNYDER: That's correct.
          THE COURT: It receives the same 12 points. And
we examined the guidelines, and it is constant since on or
about 2005 or 2004. So -- because he doesn't agree with
you, and this may be critical, because there are 12 points
attributed to this.
         MR. SNYDER: Right. Although --
          THE COURT: By "he," I mean Mr. Markus.
         MR. SNYDER: Correct. Even as to that, this
particular issue -- and first let me address your question.
          The way we got to $500 million was, first, to
start out by asking Sea Star and getting evidence from Sea
Star line as to what their Puerto Rico sales revenues were
from July of 2003, where there is evidence that Mr. Peake's
actual participation began, and we run those numbers, we ask
them to run those numbers through mid April 2008, when the
conspiracy was ended.
          THE COURT: The conspiracy was ended the day of
the raid.
         MR. SNYDER: The day of the raids.
          THE COURT: Although he was arrested in 2011.
          MR. SNYDER: Correct. But that is the broader
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period of time, the open \$900 million numbers.

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Then we also asked them to provide us with the revenue that was from the time period from essentially the actual charge in the case, which was, you know, mid-2005, until the end of the conspiracy, and we asked them to run it from essentially the date when we have, you know, the first incriminating e-mail that Mr. Peake's name was on that was introduced into evidence.

THE COURT: And that came out around 900 --

MR. SNYDER: The shorter period came out at 565.

THE COURT: 565, and the last 900 something.

MR. SNYDER: Right. So under either approach it results in the same guideline enhancement. So in that sense it is really more of a technical matter of application of the guidelines. I think under the guidelines, 1B1.3, he is responsible for all relevant conduct, whether he was charged with it or not, and that includes the broader period. It doesn't result in any difference in his sentence. I will say, it was probably more of an academic point.

With respect to, then, the issue of why within either time period we argued for all of the revenues, that they should all be attributed to him, it is because of testimony at trial that all of the components of the rates were affected, that the price increases in those rates were 90 plus percent contributable to the conspiracy, and then

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even if there are arguments about contracts, when certain contracts started or ended as to whether those should be included, there was other types of collusion that began immediately when Mr. Peake came on board that would have affected those contracts, the bunker fuel surcharge and things like that, that fluctuate numerous times during the course of the year that was all being fixed.

And then every time shipments were made during the course of a month, those fixed bunker fuel surcharges were being applied to the containers. There were other similar examples. But when all of those rates are the subject of collusion, and some of the collusion is on an annual basis, some of it is, you know, can be on a monthly or even a weekly basis depending on how often these bunker fuel surcharges are fluctuating. There was constant collusion during the course of the year about rate issues. The presumption is they are all affected, and we, the United States, you know, strongly asserts that that presumption can't be rebutted in this case.

And so it is for that reason, the presumption that all the rates were affected, there's no -- the guidelines make it very clear, we have no obligation to show that the conspiracy was successful or that it had an effect, or anything like that. But in this case, we have testimony from the coconspirators that it was effective, and that it

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was effective throughout the time period that Mr. Peake participated in the conspiracy, and that it would have affected all of that revenue.

With respect to then where I understand Mr. Peake is, he, as I understand from his last objection to the PSR, he contends that the volume of affected commerce is about \$383 million. So he would argue he shouldn't receive the enhancement applicable to the \$500 million to \$1 billion, he should receive the enhancement applicable to the \$250 million to \$500 million. Essentially, that amounts to a 2 level difference.

So I would assert the Government strongly believes that its position is correct and consistent with how the volume of commerce guidelines are applied in antitrust cases. But even if Mr. Peake's arguments are accepted, it amounts to a 2 level difference in the guidelines, which still puts his sentence probably somewhere in the 70-month range. So we're not talking about a meaningful difference in the overall guideline sentence applicable to Mr. Peake here.

THE COURT: Well, I wouldn't want to do one day.

And 70 months is not the same as 87, if we are using strictly guidelines, here.

MR. SNYDER: I do understand that, Your Honor. But in terms of what the Government's sentencing position

1 is, which is that Mr. Peake should receive a sentence 2 substantially above the level of his coconspirators, it 3 doesn't change that analysis, is what I mean. 4 THE COURT: There's one other factor which I 5 considered that you should also address, which is that his participation lasted less time than the time of the other 6 7 coconspirators. MR. SNYDER: First, that that is actually 8 9 inaccurate. Mr. Glova was the last person to join the 10 conspiracy. He didn't start in the conspiracy until January 11 2006, and the undisputed evidence from trial is Mr. Peake 12 being in the conspiracy in July of 2003. So there's a considerable difference between when Mr. Glova began 13 14 participating and when --15 THE COURT: But I meant also that as far as the 16 gentleman that received the 48 months, who is Baci, right? 17 Baci was there much more than he was. 18 MR. SNYDER: He was there about a year earlier, a 19 year and a couple months earlier. The conspiracy began in 20 late April of 2003, Mr. Peake joined in July of 2007. 21 MS. MOSS: 2002, Your Honor. 2.2 MR. SNYDER: I'm sorry. 2002. And Mr. Peake 23 joined in July of 2003. And the difference is accounted for in the volume of affected commerce. 24 25 Mr. Baci was there, he was there longer. As a

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result, more volume of commerce was affected by his participation in the conspiracy, and that was included in his guideline. And his guideline was actually above the billion dollar mark, which actually gave him additional levels in his guideline sentence. The same applies to Mr. Serra, and the same applies to Mr. Gill. They were all there longer, they affected more commerce. As a result, their guidelines were higher, and the fact that their sentences ended up being lower is entirely attributable to their acceptance of responsibility and their cooperation.

Had Mr. Peake made the decision to do the same thing that they did at the same time, he likely would have ended up with a lower sentence than they did because he would have received all the same benefits that they did. But he chose not to do that. And so for him to now turn around and argue --

THE COURT: That he wants the same.

MR. SNYDER: That he wants the same, or less, that would disincentivize their decision to cooperate and not put the Government to its burden of proof.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. MARKUS: I promise, Judge, the sky will not fall if you give a reasonable sentence in this case. I promise the Government and I promise the Court, nothing bad is going to happen. There won't be a slew of antitrust

trials if Your Honor gives Mr. Peake a sentence below the guidelines. I promise you, Your Honor. I promise you.

THE COURT: I know that.

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MR. MARKUS: This case --

THE COURT: I know that.

MR. MARKUS: There's a lot I would like to say, and I really had a tough time sitting there for the past half hour not jumping up because Mr. Peake does not deserve a sentence higher than Peter Baci, and there's a lot of reasons.

Let me start with the two objections that we have. And let me be clear that our position is not that the volume of the commerce is 380-something million. Our position is that until the Government proves what the volume of commerce is, as required under the First Circuit, the volume of commerce is zero. They have the requirement to prove three things under First Circuit law, Your Honor: Which particular deals were involved in this conspiracy; of those deals, which were the deals Frank Peake was involved in; and, third, and importantly, which of those deals affected prices unreasonably. In other words, were the prices above what the market would have beared. And what the testimony at trial was is that both from Peter Baci, Gabriel Serra, is that the prices in that way were not unreasonable. The customers were not treated unfairly. And we cite a lot of

that testimony in our papers.

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They haven't called an economist, like they would have to in a civil case. They haven't done any of the proof that they would have to show that there are unreasonable prices, and that Puerto Ricans suffered something above the market here.

In fact, Your Honor, if you remember, they filed a motion before trial saying we could not use as a defense that the prices were reasonable in this case. And Your Honor granted that motion. We could not argue to the jury, "Hey, there may have been an agreement, but it didn't affect anybody." Your Honor granted that motion. All that they had to prove at trial was that this was an agreement. But sentencing is very different. Sentencing, as Mr. Snyder pointed out, is what were the unreasonable market conditions after the conspiracy. How much was commerce affected by the conspiracy. So they do have the burden to prove to the Court, unlike they had at trial, to show how the prices were unreasonable.

If, in fact, the prices were reasonable, if they are not above the market, then the volume of commerce is zero, and they have utterly failed in their burden here, Your Honor, both because we have given you testimony from Baci and Serra saying that the prices were reasonable.

Also, there's testimony that when Navieras went out of

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business, the prices before then were under market, that was what Gabriel Serra and Peter Baci testified to, that when Navieras was in business, there was overtonnage, there was overcapacity, and, therefore, prices were unreasonably low. And so there's a cause and effect here that the prosecutors won't be able to show. And I think Mr. Snyder said it best when he said bunker fuel surcharge is a good example.

Absolutely it is a good example to show why prices were not unreasonable. The evidence at trial was that bunker fuel surcharge was a cost recovery item only, and that it was a reasonable cost recovery item. They were not making a profit on that bunker fuel surcharge. Both Baci and Serra testified before the grand jury about that, they testified at trial about that, the FBI 302s reflect it. Even if the Government proved that there was an agreement as to the timing of bunker fuel surcharge, what they did not prove was that it was an unreasonable surcharge. The testimony was uncontradicted that it was a cost recovery item.

So our position is that until they prove unreasonable prices with some sort of economist or other evidence, the volume of commerce is zero. If the Court is going to accept their position that all sales count and that the burden is on the defense to somehow come forward with evidence, we have come forward with a number of items that

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       should be discounted and those are in our papers and
      Ms. Moss will address those particular items, and that does
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      get the amount to under 500 million.
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                 I will turn it over to Ms. Moss in a second. The
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       only other objection that we have, Your Honor, is to the
      role --
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                 THE COURT: Yes. Why don't we go by the numbers
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      with you, pursuant to -- I want to see what your reaction
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       is.
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                 MR. MARKUS: Sure. So factor number -- you want
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      to go through the numbers on role?
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                 THE COURT: On role, because I think that you --
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      do you accept that he, in fact, did supervise Baci and/or
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      Chisholm?
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                 MR. MARKUS: No, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: You don't?
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                 MR. MARKUS: He supervised them at work, but he
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      was not their leader in the conspiracy. In fact, not only
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      Baci there before him, Baci was the architect with Serra as
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       to the conspiracy. They signed a contract.
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                 THE COURT: I agree with you on that. I agree
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       that they were the architects. But we have to lead with his
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      participation.
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                 MR. MARKUS: Right. So Baci received a 3 level
       enhancement as to role. Certainly, Peake should get less
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1 than that. And I know Your Honor doesn't want to give a lot of weight to the juror comment --2 3 THE COURT: I can't because you know there is an 4 instruction there that I provided that was instruction 5 number 28, jury should not consider punishment. You want to know why that is? Because it is absolutely prohibited. 6 7 MR. MARKUS: And it sounds like the jury did consider punishment. It sounds to me, and I would move for 8 9 a new trial on this, Your Honor, it sounds to me like the 10 jury thought Mr. Peake was going to get a low sentence and 11 that's why they convicted him. That's what the letter 12 says --THE COURT: If you read those two letters, they 13 14 thought he shouldn't receive the higher sentence. 15 MR. MARKUS: That he should get a low sentence. 16 The reason they convicted was that they thought he was going 17 to get a low sentence. 18 THE COURT: That means that they are concerned 19 that he would receive a higher sentence. 20 MR. MARKUS: That's exactly right. So I think 21 they disregarded your instruction there. 2.2 THE COURT: Punishment provided by law for the 23 offense charged in the indictment is a matter of exclusivity 24 within the province of the Judge. 25 MR. MARKUS: Right.

1 THE COURT: And should never be considered by you in any way in arriving at an impartial verdict. 2 3 MR. MARKUS: Right. THE COURT: As to quilt or innocence. 4 5 MR. MARKUS: It sounds to me like they considered it. But my point is something different, Your Honor. 6 7 My point is that the jurors, forget about what 8 they think about punishment, which I think the Court can and 9 should consider, and we will talk about that in a minute. 10 They also had an opinion on role in the offense. They 11 listened to the case for three weeks, and they had opinions 12 as to who was more culpable. Not -- I am putting aside the punishment comment. They said Frank Peake had a less role 13 14 than Peter Baci, Gabriel Serra, and the others. 15 They came out and didn't write just one letter, 16 they wrote two letters. I haven't been doing this as long 17 as the Court, but in 17 years I have never seen a juror 18 write two letters to the Court about role in the offense. 19 And what the juror said was that Frank Peake was an 20 occasional problem solver and had less role and less 21 involvement than Peter Baci. 2.2 In fact, what the testimony was, was that Baci 23 conferred with Mr. Peake maybe a maximum of every three months. Peake wasn't around at the creation of the 24

conspiracy, Your Honor, he had no involvement in the

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planning or day-to-day operations of the conspiracy. He didn't recruit other participants. His role at the company, he was dealing with many, many, many other things. Even if you accept everything the Government says, the conspiracy related to less than 5 percent of his activities. Serra said it. When we asked Serra about this at trial, he said less than 5 percent of his activities related to the conspiracy.

We have a lot in our papers concerning role on this point, Your Honor, both in our objections at pages 18 and 19 in our sentencing memo.

THE COURT: But I tend to agree with your brother counsel in that he says that Peake and Serra participated many times in resolving the disputes between the general managers of sales. He cites volume 2, page 57 to 59, volume 5, page 17 to 21, and 24 to 26, volume 7, 56 to 59, and 85 through 86. And the dispute with Sea Star about the 50/50, the dispute that he had to solve between the 50/50 sharing cargo relating to the movement of fast ships between Florida and Puerto Rico, Exhibits 73 and 182.

So he has him participating, and he created some others. I think he created at least five events. At least five, which are addressed, I think, quite correctly, at pages 6 and 7 of Docket 215. And those are with specific references to the record, and that is unrebutted evidence.

MR. MARKUS: I think it is rebutted, Your Honor. 2 If you look at pages 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of our pleading, we 3 go through Baci's testimony where he explains he ran the 4 conspiracy. 5 THE COURT: I have no doubt that he was the soldier down there. 6 7 MR. MARKUS: No, no. Not the soldier, Your Honor, he started it. He was --8 9 THE COURT: I know. But of course he started it. 10 Mr. Peake did not arrive until over a year after the 11 conspiracy began. Obviously, he is not the architect. 12 Obviously. 13 MR. MARKUS: Right. And so if Baci was the 14 architect and was running the thing, certainly -- and the 15 jury felt this way, too. He is more culpable. Yes. If you 16 believe the Government, Frank Peake was an occasional 17 problem solver. That doesn't make you a 4 level leader. 18 So he may have been the boss at the company, but 19 he wasn't the big boss of the conspiracy, Your Honor. Even 20 Serra was in a much different position than Frank. Serra 21 also was at that initial meeting creating the conspiracy, 2.2 forming the outline of the conspiracy, telling -- figuring 23 out with Baci how they are going to communicate with 24 throwaway phones and e-mail addresses and those sorts of 25 things. Serra, Baci, and Gill were in much different

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      positions than Frank Peake, who came in much later, didn't
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       recruit anybody, didn't run the day to day, and as the jury
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       said, was an occasional problem solver. I am not talking
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       about relying on the jury for punishment here. I am talking
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       about relying on the jury for fact finding. That's what we
      do.
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                 And so they found and asked the Court to find that
      Mr. Peake was not as culpable as Mr. Baci was. And so
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       that's our argument on role, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: What is the difference between what
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      Baci -- under the guidelines, what is the difference if Baci
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      goes to the highest, and the defendant goes to the 12 range,
      what is the difference? Two points? He goes to the -- he
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      goes to the next one. Baci went to the next category.
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                 THE PROBATION OFFICER: 14?
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                 THE COURT: 14.
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                 MR. SNYDER: I am not understanding.
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                 MR. MARKUS: I don't understand Your Honor's
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       question.
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                 THE COURT: Well, you just mentioned that because
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      Baci was longer, his responsibility under the amount was
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      higher.
                 MR. MARKUS: He received 14 levels under --
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                 THE COURT: So there's a difference of 2 points.
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                 MR. MARKUS: Correct. That's not role. That goes
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1 to the volume of commerce. 2 THE COURT: It goes to the volume. Yes. Yes. 3 That's what I was talking about. To the volume. 4 I don't think I am going to be persuaded about the 5 role because I think he does match most of the criteria, and there can be more than one leader. Who is the most honcho, 6 7 that's later to be decided when we hear all the evidence, when I hear all the arguments, but I want to separate and to 8 9 make the distinctions that I ought to make. 10 Just like I added three points for acceptance of 11 responsibility and technically 3 points for substantial 12 assistance, I think I have to deduct from him in order to 13 put him equal to Baci, I have to deduct 2 points on the 14 volume of business. 15 Go ahead. 16 MR. MARKUS: Well, then if I understand Your Honor's ruled on role, then we will move on to volume of 17 18 commerce. I mean --19 THE COURT: I have ruled on role, and I think I 20 have to put him at a different level than Baci. But that doesn't mean that 12 is not correct. That means that Baci 21 2.2 was at 14. All right. That's all there is. Go ahead.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ MARKUS: I'm not sure how you want me to proceed on --

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Keep on going.

1 THE COURT: You proceed to your picture. MR. MARKUS: On the volume --2 3 THE COURT: I may ask questions, but you proceed to your picture. 4 5 MR. MARKUS: On the volume of commerce issue, again, our position is that it should be zero, unless the 6 7 Government proves up volume of commerce at a sentencing 8 hearing. 9 THE COURT: But I think that they cited two cases 10 in their brief that are strong cases to the contrary. 11 MR. MARKUS: Well, they are not First Circuit, 12 Your Honor, and they are not binding on this Court. And 13 there's no First Circuit case that --14 THE COURT: There is no First Circuit case on the 15 matter. Of course there is no First Circuit case on the 16 matter. But they cited two cases relating to that matter, 17 which the Court thought were quite convincing. It is the 18 Giordano and Andreas case. 19 MR. MARKUS: But, Judge --20 THE COURT: Those two cases. 21 MR. MARKUS: Those two cases factually are very 2.2 different. Those cases didn't have the testimony that we 23 have here that was the prices were reasonable. I mean, we 24 have Serra and Baci both saying that the prices were not 25 unreasonable. We also have the Navieras issue going out of

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       business where the prices were unreasonably low before that.
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       So I think --
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                 THE COURT: But I don't think it is a defense in
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       antitrust that you can agree on the prices and then you can
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       say fine. The point is they are not competitive. Not if
       they're reasonable. Because who knows what's reasonable.
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                 MR. MARKUS: That's why the Government has to
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       prove it, Your Honor. They want to sentence this man to 12
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       additional points saying that Puerto Ricans were harmed by
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       over $500 million. That's not true.
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                 THE COURT: They want that because the market of
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       Puerto Rico in several types of businesses was affected.
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                 MR. MARKUS: It wasn't.
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                 THE COURT: Well --
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                 MR. MARKUS: They have to show that, Your Honor,
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                 In a civil --
       somehow.
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                 THE COURT: I think it is you who has to show it.
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                 MR. MARKUS: I think we did have with Baci's and
19
       Serra's testimony saying the prices were not unreasonable
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       and Navieras going out of business.
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                 Just take a step back and look at the big picture
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       for a second, Your Honor. In your civil cases, before you
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       can get damages, you have to show damage with an economist,
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       with some evidence.
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                 What the Government is telling you here is don't
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worry about all that civil stuff. Don't worry about having to show anything. We just presume it, and we want to give the guy 87 months in prison on that presumption. That's insane. I mean, this is a man's liberty, and as you said, you wouldn't want to do one day. They need to come forward with some proof.

THE COURT: The Sixth Circuit and the Seventh

Circuit -- by the way, the Seventh Circuit is a circuit that

we normally follow, together with the Fifth, not necessarily

the Sixth. But here's what it says: The presumption must

be that all sales during the period of the conspiracy have

been affected by the illegal agreement. That's the issue.

The illegal agreement.

MS. MOSS: Are affected.

THE COURT: I think we have a change of characters here now.

MS. MOSS: All sales affected, Judge. Not just all sales. All sales affected by the conspiracy.

I want to start out -- I am going to talk about volume of commerce, and I'm going to be talking about numbers, which I realize is not a juicy or sexy topic, but it is crucial here, Judge. And when the Government stands up and says that there's no meaningful difference if you choose 10 points or 12 points or 8 points, it is incredibly offensive to me, Your Honor. It angers me. It shows a

1 complete lack of understanding of the sentencing process and 2 what effect this has on this individual before you, 3 Your Honor. 4 It has no meaningful difference? It makes all the 5 difference here, Judge. And what Your Honor just read about sales affected, again, Your Honor pointed to the cases 6 7 Andreas and Giordano. And what those cases say is that it is not all sales, but it is all sales that were affected by 8 9 the conspiracy. And, again, our position is that they have 10 to prove that they were affected by the conspiracy. 11 Now, if Your Honor disagrees or you are placing 12 the burden on us, we still believe that we can show you --13 and we know that their numbers are wrong. Now, I want to 14 start out --15 THE COURT: We are not now talking about beyond a 16 reasonable doubt. We are now talking a preponderance of the 17 evidence. MS. MOSS: Correct. 18 19 THE COURT: Which is a civil criteria. All right. 20 Go ahead. 21 MS. MOSS: A lower criteria. 2.2 THE COURT: A lower criteria, but still civil. It is civil. 23 24 MS. MOSS: The Government stood up here and talked 25 about Peter Baci's numbers, and the volume of commerce

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       applicable to Peter Baci. I need to begin by stating,
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       Judge, we have submitted an affidavit from Peter Baci, and I
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       provided it to the Court ahead of time. Do you have that,
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       Your Honor?
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                 THE COURT: Yes.
                 MS. MOSS: And in this affidavit, Peter Baci even
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       disagrees with the volume of commerce numbers. However,
       because Peter Baci wanted to believe --
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 9
                 THE COURT: He accepted his.
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                 MS. MOSS: Because he was precluded. Because he
11
       wanted to plead, he was precluded from arguing the volume of
12
       commerce numbers. He was forced to accept them, Judge, and
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       I see that you are laughing --
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                 THE COURT: I am smiling.
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                 MS. MOSS: I see that you are smiling.
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                 THE COURT: I am smiling because you have to look
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       at the fact that he accepted.
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                 MS. MOSS: He accepted them.
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                 THE COURT: You can say whatever you would like,
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       but he did under oath accept the plea agreement.
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                 MS. MOSS: And he is saying under oath that he
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       disagrees with them, Judge.
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                 THE COURT: So what do you do once a person takes
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       a deposition and then later he wants to take it off with a
25
       sworn statement?
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MS. MOSS: Judge, I think you -- the Government's relying on Peter Baci. I think you have to rely on Peter Baci for us as well, Judge. He gave an affidavit where he said the numbers are wrong. And he goes step by step as to why the numbers are wrong, and I am going to go through that with you now.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. MOSS: Are you going to listen?

THE COURT: I am.

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MS. MOSS: Judge, I am going to start off with saying, again, this makes a huge difference. Whether

Your Honor finds over 500 million, which is 12 points, or under 500 million, which is 10 points or even less than that, makes a huge difference. That's a year and a half to three years in this man's life.

Now, I think that the starting point for the Court is that we have to look at the indictment. And the indictment charged Mr. Peake with participating in this conspiracy from late 2005 to April 2008. So that's the starting point.

Now, the Government can get up here all they want and talk about responsibility for relevant conduct. But that doesn't matter unless they prove it. They have to show some proof towards that, which they did not do here.

And, Your Honor, during the course of this trial,

1 Your Honor gave instructions to the jury, and I am going to read directly from my objections. 2 3 THE COURT: Yes. MS. MOSS: Where you say: "I want you to keep 4 5 clear" -- I am on page 11, Your Honor. THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. 6 7 MS. MOSS: "That even though it is alleged that the conspiracy began in 2002 by these other people, there is 8 9 no evidence that he joined this conspiracy. The Court 10 cannot allow evidence before 2005 because it is charged as 11 to him as 2005." 12 And Your Honor goes on to say, that: "So he is only responsible, subject to your credibility and your 13 14 weight, and keeping in mind that he is presumed innocent, 15 that it is up to the United States to prove beyond a 16 reasonable doubt his participation between 2005 and 2008." 17 And Your Honor saw from the evidence in this case, 18 every piece of evidence admitted against Frank Peake, 19 whether by e-mail, or report, or meeting, or itinerary, or 20 plane ticket, was 2005 or later. So that's the starting 21 point. 2.2 And even the reliance of the Government on this 23 sheet of paper provided by Sea Star as to this \$565 million 24 figure, even that, Your Honor, I say is flawed. Because,

again, what he is charged with is late 2005, and that's what

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the evidence showed. I am just going to use the ELMO for a second.

When you look at late 2005, already the numbers are below 500 million. And I am going to tell you, these are not exact numbers, these are approximate numbers. But whether they are approximate or exact, it is clearly under 500 million. So from that starting point, from considering what he was charged with, the time period he was charged with, we are already below 500 million.

The next step, Your Honor, and this is just going step by step through my objections. The PSR, again, we have to focus on sales that were affected by the conspiracy. Not all sales.

And there are a myriad of sales that were not affected. And included in that were sales from the transportation of freight that was never ever even discussed as part of this conspiracy, discussed as part of the conspiracy. And what do I mean by that? There was an abundance of testimony by Peter Baci and by others that Horizon and Sea Star had different kinds of ships. Are you following?

THE COURT: I am following.

MR. MARKUS: Okay.

MS. MOSS: Okay. Horizon ships could only carry containers. So what you put in a container, the boxes that

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you put in a container, that's all that they could ship.

Sea Star ships were completely different. They could carry containers, they had huge tanks that they could fill with liquid, they could carry livestock, they could carry cars, they could carry huge pieces of construction equipment. They were able to carry a lot of different types of freight that Horizon couldn't. So there was no collusion about those types of freight. And, again, I referenced in my objections, our objections, these different types of freight, which include bulk fructose. Amounts to, again, during the time of the conspiracy, \$10.8 million. Cars, \$6.6 million. NIC, which means "not in container," those livestock or cattle or chickens or whatever they may have, \$11.7 million. And other special equipment, such as the big construction equipment, 3.1 million.

And, Judge, I am not --

THE COURT: That's what I thought the conspiracy was covering, all of that.

MS. MOSS: No, it wasn't.

And, in fact, if you look at the testimony by

Peter Baci, he specifically says those things were excluded

from the 50/50 agreement. Because they couldn't collude

about cars, about fructose, liquid, about things not in

containers like cows. They couldn't collude about those

things. So they were not part of the conspiracy. And that

1 was the proof at trial. That was the testimony at trial. 2 So when you add those numbers up, and, again, we start off with the period of late 2005 through 2008, 462 3 million, subtract now the revenue for this freight that they 4 5 did not collude on, and the testimony which they did not collude on it, 32.5 million. We are down to 429.5 million. 6 7 The next step. And, again, Judge, I am following straight with my objections. 8 9 There were some contracts in this case that were 10 negotiated well before Mr. Peake ever came on, and well 11 before a conspiracy ever started. Starting in 2002, early 12 2002, there was a contract with the United States Postal 13 Service for I believe it was \$4.3 million. This was 14 negotiated before this conspiracy began. So, obviously, 15 that contract was not affected by the violation, and, 16 therefore, the sales and the revenue from that contract 17 cannot be included in the volume of commerce. 18 And, again, that number -- and if you refer to 19 Peter Baci's affidavit, he also speaks about this. If you 20 subtracted that number, now we get down to even less, 425 21 million. 2.2 And, Judge, I just want to say that I am putting out a lot of numbers. 23 24 THE COURT: I am understanding. Keep going.

MS. MOSS: But the numbers are not numbers that I

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am making up. These are numbers that are provided by Sea
Star or provided and researched by Peter Baci who was one of
the key witnesses in this case.

The next step. Peter Baci has stated under oath, he provided an affidavit, that he never discussed with his competitors, with Horizon, a number of customers, and he went through the painstaking effort of writing it down, handwriting each one of these customers down. And if Your Honor takes a look at it, this is in Exhibit 1-A that I provided to the Court, this is probably 30 pages of customers. And I believe we totaled them up to 2,634 customers that were never part of the conspiracy. Never discussed. What Your Honor heard in the trial is a lot about what were called the Hall of Fame reports.

THE COURT: The Hall of Famers. The large-volumed clients.

MS. MOSS: Right. The top 100 clients, who actually only made up 20 percent of the clientele of Sea Star and Horizon. So there's 80 percent of these customers that were never discussed as part of this conspiracy. And, again, referring to the numbers that Peter Baci researched that were provided by Sea Star, these customers for this time period of 2005 to 2008 equals to \$39 million.

THE COURT: But there were also the reefers, and the agreement as to reefers was complete. And those were

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not only as to Hall of Famers, because a Hall of Famer may not necessarily come in with -- there may be Hall of Famers that were not in the big leagues in the Hall of Fame, but they were substantial clients under the reefer agreements.

MS. MOSS: Not according to Peter Baci, not according to the testimony, not according to the e-mails. What the e-mails showed is that Peter Baci and Greg Glova were going back and forth bid rigging on very specific customers. And those customers were part of the conspiracy. These customers that I am talking about now were not. And so again, I say Your Honor, you have to subtract another \$39 million. And so we are getting here even further and further and further below the \$500 million mark. And these are estimated numbers, the numbers are probably much, much higher.

So that's the next step. So we have now given you four separate reasons, four separate examples of sales that have to be excluded because they were not affected by the conspiracy.

Now, the Government got up here and talked about bunker fuel surcharge. As Mr. Markus said, this was a cost recovery tool. And the argument they made I think is incredibly flawed. Because what the testimony was as to bunker fuel surcharge, and I have it here if Your Honor wants to see it, is that Peter Baci testified that, of

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course, yes, the bunker fuel surcharge went up and down because the cost of fuel went up and down. But the bunker fuel surcharge had no effect on the contract whatsoever.

And if you assume that there was --

THE COURT: I remember seeing an e-mail where the fact that somebody undercut in bunker fuel created an agreement in another place.

MS. MOSS: Well, Your Honor, what I think you are referring to, honestly, is somebody who undercut on intermodal fuel, intermodal transportation costs, but not bunker fuel. But in any case, I will say that there were exceptions to bunker fuel surcharge, but very few exceptions. And throughout the time period, they tried to eliminate as many exceptions as possible.

But I go back to, Judge, again, even if there was no conspiracy at all, that bunker fuel surcharge still would have been in place, it would have been in place at exactly the same amount of price as it was instituted in this case, and it would apply to the same exact customers because Peter Baci testified -- I will go ahead and I will put it up on the screen, Judge.

Because this comes directly from the trial. He said that Sea Star had a specific formula for determining what's the bunker fuel surcharge. And it was very technical, it went back to 1998 when Sea Star started, and

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what the price of fuel was at that time, and how they
measured the change and utilization in the fuel, but it was
a very specific formula, and they followed that formula each
and every time. That is how they set the price.

Now, there may have been collusion about timing, but not about the price. The price would have been the same regardless of any conspiracy. And because of that, Judge, it doesn't apply to every piece of freight. In fact, it applies to no piece of freight.

And I don't have the numbers because we don't have access to those numbers, we don't have access to the same materials and documents that the Government does. But that number has to be in the millions of dollars. So now, Judge, I think I have offered you four things, and I am going to get to the last thing now.

And this was the subject of our last amended objections that we filed. And this is the TSA revenue. And I am sure Your Honor remembers the TSA, the transportation service agreements, that Horizon and Sea Star had with each other.

So Sea Star carried freight of their own customers, but they also carried freight for Horizon, for Horizon customers on their own ships. And the Government went to great length to show to the jury that these TSAs between Horizon and Sea Star were completely legitimate,

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completely lawful and legal, and had absolutely nothing to do with the conspiracy. And they asked each witness that question, and they all agreed. Nothing to do with the conspiracy. And I will just put that up very briefly.

Glova: When you communicated with Sea Star about the TSA, were those appropriate and legitimate? They were appropriate and legitimate.

Baci: It should be excluded from the volume commerce.

Serra: Nothing illegal about the discussions of the TSA.

Your Honor, I have submitted again as part of the sentencing today, Exhibit 2, which is a chart provided by Sea Star that gives you the numbers for the TSA for the time period, again, that Mr. Peake was charged. And that number is 2.7 million.

So, Your Honor, I end with calculating the volume of commerce. And this is a very, very conservative estimate. We start off with the time period that he's charged with, 462 million. We subtract all the revenue for the cows and the liquid and all of that, 32.5 million. The contracts that were entered before conspiracy was even started, a minimum of 4.3 million. Revenue from the customers that were never discussed, at least 39 million. Revenue from the bunker fuel surcharge, a number that I

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1
       don't have access to, but, again, was probably millions of
2
      dollars. And revenues from the Horizon, Sea Star,
3
       transportation service agreement, $2.7 million.
 4
                 We are down to $383.5 million, well below $500
 5
      million. Even if you were to take out one of these steps,
      we are still well below $500 million. Your Honor, I would
 6
7
      assert that we are even below $250 million. Unfortunately,
      we don't have access to those numbers, and the Government
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 9
      has failed to prove them up. I think it is quite clear,
10
       Judge.
11
                 THE COURT: What is the month that we can agree on
      that he began in -- it said late 2005. What is late 2005?
12
13
                 MS. MOSS: We were not provided that, Judge.
14
                 THE COURT: What is the evidence that the United
15
      States has?
16
                 MR. SNYDER: July, Your Honor. That's why we
17
      provided the numbers we did.
18
                 THE COURT: You say it is July.
19
                 MR. SNYDER: That's what we said, yes. It is
20
      based on the evidence in the record, Your Honor, which said
21
       July.
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                 THE COURT: Okay.
23
                 MS. MOSS: It is not based on the indictment,
              It is also not based on your instructions to the
24
       Judge.
25
       jury.
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1 MR. SNYDER: To be clear, we, because of sentencing guideline 1B1.3, you include all relevant 2 3 conduct. So, again, that pushes our date back to July of 4 2003, which is where all the evidence at trial said that 5 Mr. Peake began participating in the conspiracy. MS. MOSS: It is not what the evidence showed, 6 7 Judge. In fact, if you go back and look at the transcripts, the evidence does not show that. They do not state that. 8 9 And, again, even though in some instances the Government may 10 include all relevant conduct, again, the case law is quite 11 clear, from the First Circuit and every other circuit, it is 12 relevant conduct that they actually prove. And they have 13 not done that. 14 MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, in terms of the 15 evidentiary record on the late 2005 --16 THE COURT: Do we have anything on the record that 17 I can refer to? 18 MR. SNYDER: Exhibit 37 is an incriminating e-mail 19 exchange that Mr. Peake was involved in, and it dates to 20 June 2005, June 7, 2005. So we ran numbers from the 21 beginning of the next month. 2.2 MS. MOSS: Judge, I just want to point out that 23 the e-mail they are referring to, the infamous BS e-mail, 24 Judge, where they are again referring to past action by Sea Star and by Horizon, those "who shot John" reports, not 25

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1
       conspiracy related.
2
                 MR. SNYDER: The purpose of exchanging those
       e-mails was conspiracy related because they were complaining
 3
 4
       to each other about things they had done contrary to the
 5
       conspiracy.
                 MS. MOSS: We disagree with that, Your Honor.
 6
 7
                 THE COURT: All right. But still, even that, even
       if I take that, wouldn't we be really closer to less than
 8
 9
       500,000?
10
                 MS. MOSS: Absolutely. 500 million. Yes.
11
      Without a doubt.
12
                 THE COURT: What's your position relating to that?
13
                 MR. SNYDER: Do you want the short answer or long
14
       answer? Because --
15
                 THE COURT: I want an appropriate answer pursuant
16
      to the record.
17
                 MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, the Government's position
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       is that that $565 million from July 2005 to the end of the
19
       conspiracy is a conservative number. And that's even
20
      without going back further in time. And in our objections
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       to the -- in responding to their objections to the
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      pre-sentence report, on all of these points she just made,
23
      we provide a written response. For instance, not in
       container goods are still subject to the bunker fuel
24
25
       surcharge. And they also were subject to the conspiracy
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with Crowley, who did carry noncontainerized goods.

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I can take you through it. The bunker fuel surcharge. I can show you a document that shows they were, in fact, profiting on the bunker fuel surcharge that Peter Baci drafted, and it was sent by Mr. Peake to Gabe Serra. So there are responses to all of these things. And during the time period charged in this case, \$565 million, the Government believes is the accurate number.

The case law is not just strong, it is indisputable. There are no cases that hold any of the propositions that she had just stood up here to argue to you. The case law is very clear. You cited some of the cases. There was always Hayter Oil, SKW. All of these cases say that once you are convicted of participation in the conspiracy, all sales are presumed to be affected. All sales.

THE COURT: But she just proved that those sales were out.

MR. SNYDER: And I can sit here, if you would like, I can go back through every one of the categories and tell you why she is wrong. I just -- let's take noncontainerized goods as just one example.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SNYDER: She says they weren't part of the 50/50 because Horizon didn't carry them. That's her

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argument. Well, they still were subject to a bunker fuel surcharge, which was fixed. So the rate charged for those noncontainerized goods was still affected by the conspiracy.

Additionally, Crowley was part of the conspiracy. Crowley carried used cars. Mr. Baci in interviews, we didn't get into this at trial, but there are interviews and I believe grand jury testimony by Mr. Baci where he says:

"We were fixing the prices of used car shipments, which are not in containerized goods with Crowley." So those were affected by the conspiracy.

And I can take you through every one of these items --

THE COURT: For example, were the automobiles subject to the surcharge?

MR. SNYDER: I believe there was a bunker fuel surcharge related to the automobiles, yes. If it was moving this cargo, it was subject to a bunker fuel surcharge.

But, the rate, the actual used car shipment rate was also being fixed, and that was being fixed between Sea Star and Crowley. So it doesn't matter whether Horizon was involved in that piece because they didn't carry that type of cargo. The rate of that cargo was still being fixed with Crowley, and there's evidence of that, as well as the bunker fuel surcharge that applied to it was being fixed with Horizon.

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And to address the bunker fuel surcharge, if Sea Star was so confident that they had this formula and they were going to follow it, there was no need for them to fix the rate with Horizon. There was no need to talk about it. The reason they were talking about it is because it was an element of competition. If Sea Star went up \$30, \$40 per container on its bunker fuel surcharge and Horizon didn't, they stood to lose, and both Glova and Baci testified to that at trial.

Additionally, Trial Exhibit 125, which I can put on the ELMO, right here, Mr. Baci is basically saying that in 2002 and 2003 at the very beginning of the conspiracy, they had their bunker fuel surcharge revenue, which was lower than the actual cost of bunker. The first year of the conspiracy, by 2003, most of that deficit was wiped out. By 2004 and 2005, they are earning millions of dollars per year as profit off of bunker fuel. This is Exhibit 125. This was an e-mail that was sent or a document that was sent by Mr. Peake to Mr. Serra. This was not cost recovery, this was collusion, and it affected every single item of cargo that was shipped on one of these ships during the whole time of the conspiracy.

That's the end of the story on the bunker fuel surcharge, and, really, about volume of commerce generally. The case law is very clear, that all sales are presumed

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       affected by the conspiracy, and the word is "affect."
2
       word "reasonableness" --
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                 THE COURT: That was the word they used.
                 MR. SNYDER: But they are equating that to
 4
 5
       unreasonable. They have to be unreasonable prices.
                 MS. MOSS: That's a different argument, Judge.
 6
 7
                 MR. SNYDER: The word "unreasonable" is no where
       in the sentencing guideline. No where. The word is
 8
 9
       "affect."
10
                 THE COURT: It's no where in those two cases
11
       either?
                 MR. SNYDER: Correct. It is "affected." And
12
       "affect" is defined very, very broadly.
13
14
                 The Government doesn't have to show it is
15
       unreasonable. The case law is clear, to get a conviction,
16
       the agreement is the crime. And the cases have recognized
17
       that it would be inconsistent or it would be ironic if after
18
       saying the person is convicted, even without proof of
19
       effect, because all prices are deemed to be unreasonable, if
20
       the Government then had to turn around in sentencing and
21
       prove that the prices were unreasonable.
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                 And I guess the last point with respect to the
23
       sentencing guidelines is that the reason the Government
24
       doesn't have to prove effect is because the guideline
25
       presumes a 20 percent effect. When you calculate a
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corporate fine, you take the volume of the entire affected commerce, and there's a 20 percent multiplier in there, and under the guidelines, that is presumed to be the effect of the conspiracy. And the reason they have that is they recognize that effects can be direct and indirect, and they are not always easy to prove. And so there is an element of effect that's built into the guideline itself.

So if you have any other questions, I am happy to respond.

THE COURT: Fine.

Anything further? I am waiting for the --

MS. MOSS: I do have something further, Your

Honor.

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THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. MOSS: I am actually glad the Government put this up here because this does give us some numbers, Judge. When I was saying before I didn't have the numbers as to the bunker fuel surcharge, now we have some numbers. This \$400 million. And it doesn't matter whether it was a cost recovery tool or they actually made revenue from it, Your Honor, because -- and I think that the Government is completely misunderstanding the whole bunker fuel surcharge purpose, and I want to make sure that Your Honor doesn't. Because, again, there was no collusion about the amount of the bunker fuel surcharge. So it doesn't matter that is

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applied to every piece of freight, which it didn't. We know it didn't.

What I have said, and what we have said in our pleadings, again, and I just -- you know, I know I am being repetitive, Judge, but this is really important, and I really think you need to understand this. That, again, whether there was a conspiracy or not, that bunker fuel surcharge was going to apply to every piece of freight that was transported, and it was going to apply at the price that they instituted it, because Peter Baci used a formula that was based on the cost of fuel that had nothing to do with the conspiracy. So it was going to apply regardless of this conspiracy. And that's why it has to be excluded, because it wasn't affected by the violation, affected by the conspiracy.

And I don't want the Government to confuse you about this use of the words "reasonable," "unreasonable."

What the case law says, and we have cited all the same cases that the Government has cited, and they do say that the Government has to not only show all sales that were affected by the violation, but that were above market price.

Judge, and with that, I will sit down.

THE COURT: So the word that I am looking for in Andreas and Giordano that is not here, is what?

MR. SNYDER: "Reasonableness," "unreasonableness."

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1
                 MS. MOSS: Judge, what Andreas says, I will put it
2
       up on the ELMO. The plain language --
 3
                 THE COURT: It says affected by the violation, but
       you also said another word. I'll look at the transcript.
 4
 5
                 Anything from the defense? I thought you were
 6
       going to make a presentation.
 7
                 MR. MARKUS: Yes, Your Honor. This goes to the
       3553 factors, Your Honor.
 8
 9
                 THE COURT: I know. Character of the person.
10
                 MR. MARKUS: Yes.
11
                 THE COURT: Fine.
12
                 MR. MARKUS: So, Your Honor, after we figure out
      what the quidelines are, which is one of the 3553 factors --
13
14
                 THE COURT: It is one of them.
15
                 MR. MARKUS: Right. Not one that's entitled to
16
       any specific weight or anything like this.
17
                 THE COURT: It's a reasonable place to begin.
18
       That's all it is.
19
                 MR. MARKUS: Sometimes, Your Honor, in this case
20
       it is not, and we will go through the reasons why it is not.
21
                 One of the main reasons it is not, Your Honor, is
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      because it would lead to the highest sentence ever in the
23
      history of the United States for an antitrust case. Not
24
       just in this case, but in any case ever, Your Honor. And
25
       Frank Peake doesn't deserve that sentence for the reasons we
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will go through now.

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Just briefly, though, to overview, the highest sentence in the history of the United States ever for an antitrust case is 48 months. As we will discuss in a moment, these same prosecutors recently told the judge sitting in the same position as you, that she should sentence the worst antitrust defendants ever to 10 years. And that Judge rejected these prosecutors' arguments and give a three-year sentence, and the sky did not fall, Your Honor. They are still prosecuting antitrust cases and people are still pleading guilty.

In this case, he is less culpable than Baci and Serra. And we will discuss why that is, but you have noted some of the reasons, Your Honor. And so it is not enough to say the extra baggage of Baci on acceptance and cooperation mean that that's the starting point. You also have to look at the extra baggage that Baci has with obstructing justice, meaning he got 2 extra points and should get a higher sentence than Frank Peake. Meaning the extra baggage of the higher volume of commerce, meaning he gets a higher sentence than Peake. Meaning the extra baggage that the jury listened to three weeks of evidence and said he is less culpable than the others.

So we know the 3553 factors, Your Honor, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

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characteristics of the defendant, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment, and the need to afford adequate deterrence. Each one of these factors point in our favor.

And so we will start with his background, and I know Ms. Moss is going to talk about his background, and then I will get into some of the other factors. So I will leave it to her on this factor.

MS. MOSS: Judge, I don't think I need to say very much about Mr. Peake's background because Your Honor already stated this morning that you know that he is, I think in your words, you said he was an extremely decent person.

And, of course, 3553(a) requires the Court --

THE COURT: I said except for this conduct. That is right. I did say that.

MS. MOSS: And that's important because,

Your Honor, the 3553(a) factors require the Court to look at
the history and characteristics of the defendant. Because
it is not just important to look at a small isolated piece
of time in this man's life, but to look at the man as a
whole, to look at the totality of this individual before
you, and the whole of his life.

And what the whole of his life will show is that

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he is a good, decent, honorable man who has devoted himself to other people, Judge, and that is the predominant theme. That is what I stood up before the Court, and before the jury during my opening statement, and I said to them, and I said, "Frank Peake has been described by person after person after person as being the best man I have ever met. Being one of the finest men you will ever meet." And that wasn't just posturing for the jury, Judge. That is what people have sincerely and honestly said about him.

And, you know, he's done very well in his career, Judge, and I think it is important for you to know that he's not somebody that comes from wealth, he is not somebody that comes from advantages, he is not somebody that was born with a silver spoon in his mouth. This is someone who came from a blue collar background, with blue collar values, whose father was a police officer for 30 years, whose mother was mostly a stay-at-home mom. He had parents who didn't graduate from high school.

But Mr. Peake worked very hard and educated himself and did very well in his career to become the president of Sea Star at a very young age, at 40 years old, 42 years old. But even though he was so accomplished, Judge, I think at his core, what he remains is a good person.

And what Mr. Markus had on the screen before,

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pictures of Mr. Peake with his family, because what
Mr. Peake is is, you know, in addition to being the
president of Sea Star for the short period of time, he's
also a brother. And I hope Your Honor had the opportunity
and the honor to read the letters written by his brother,
Chris, who's shown here, his sister Debra, his in-laws, and
his children who are pictured here, who Mr. Peake is their
rock. He is the one that they turn to, and the one that
they rely on.

And dozens upon dozens of people have written letters for him, to talk about what a good man this is. And I know Your Honor talked about the 140 pages of pleadings, but this was even more pages written about the goodness of Frank Peake.

Your Honor talked about -- or the Government talked about how these coconspirators have earned credits or earned reductions because of things like cooperation.

Mr. Peake has earned credits and deductions because of his

decency and because of his contributions.

And, Judge, I am referring to the letters, and we have them up on the slide here.

THE COURT: Yes. I saw those letters, and I've jumped over that already because I am ready.

MS. MOSS: But, Judge, it is really important, because this is one of the main factors of 3553(a). That's

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1
       why I am spending time on this. And, Judge, it is important
2
       to know who some of these letters were provided by.
 3
                 THE COURT: Okay. The problem is is that you had
 4
      already flashed that, and you went to another subject.
 5
                 MS. MOSS: Okay, Judge. Well, I hope you take the
       time to read these because I think these quotes are
 6
7
       significant. For someone to write that you are the finest
 8
      man that they have ever met, I mean, I wish people could
 9
      write these things about me, Judge. But these are things
10
       that people have written about Frank Peake. "Frank Peake is
11
       the guy you would like your sister or your daughter to
12
      marry." I mean, how many men are you going to say that
13
       about, Judge.
14
                 And these are letters that were written by
15
      military officers, owners of companies, heads of companies.
16
      And I see Your Honor is moving on.
17
                 THE COURT: I am moving on to the next one.
18
      next page.
19
                 MR. MARKUS: Why don't we move onto the next one.
20
                 THE COURT: I am on the next page.
21
                 MS. MOSS: Frank Peake's background.
2.2
                 THE COURT: No. No. The one before that. That's
23
       the one I am at now.
24
                 MS. MOSS: And what this addresses, Your Honor, is
25
       Frank Peake as the head of Sea Star, Frank Peake as an
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employee of Sea Star. And this is going to become especially important later when Mr. Markus is talking about the findings of other judges around the country. Particularly in the First Circuit in the Prosperi case, about people who were acting for the good of their companies. And people who were trying to make better for their companies and the loyalty of the companies, not for themselves. And what those quotes show is that Frank Peake was

And what those quotes show is that Frank Peake was more than devoted to this company and to his employees. And they all say that they worked very hard during this time because they wanted to do better for Frank Peake. Because Frank Peake was committed to improving the company, to working hard to providing the best service in the Puerto Rico trade. That's who Frank Peake is.

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And, Judge, again, I hope you had the opportunity to read all the letters and to read what we have written in our sentencing memorandum, and I will rely on those pleadings, and I hope that you will see when you are deciding his fate, who this man is in his entirety. He is a good man. He's a die hard Yankee fan, Judge.

MR. SNYDER: Objection, Your Honor. That's pandering. He's a Philly fan. We all know that.

THE COURT: He really is a Red Sox fan.

MS. MOSS: No. Absolutely not.

1 THE COURT: Or a Mariner fan.

2.2

MS. MOSS: Judge, I think a lot, especially with the passing of Nelson Mandela, who talked about contributing to your community, about people with good hearts and good heads. Your Honor may find for a period of time maybe his head was not in the right place, but his heart has always been in the right place.

And he is a good person. We have written in the memorandum about the number of community organizations that he has contributed to, and there's probably a list of 20 in there, including YMCA, Boys and Girls Club of America, Covenant House, things like that, that this man has devoted himself to other people.

And I think Your Honor must take that into consideration and understand that -- and I see you are moving on, Judge.

THE COURT: I am already at the next page, which is the comparison.

MR. MARKUS: Here we go, because I don't want you to have to get the guest room ready, Your Honor.

So here we go. The comparison to the conspirators in this case. These were the conspirators that the Government has discussed in this case. Baci, Serra, Gill, Glova. One person they haven't discussed was Shapiro, who, of course, was one of the other architects of the conspiracy

who wasn't charged and got zero months.

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If they want to compare apples to apples, let's discuss apples to apples because the conspiracy period for Frank Peake is less, that's one reason he should get less than Baci and Serra. The volume of commerce was less than Frank Peake, that's a reason he should get less than Baci and Serra. Frank Peake didn't obstruct justice like Peter Baci did. Frank Peake didn't start this conspiracy like Baci, Serra, Gill, and Shapiro did. And the jurors, Your Honor, the jurors thought he was less culpable.

Those are all reasons why if you want to -- you can't just say Baci pled guilty and got cooperation, therefore, Frank Peake should get more. No. There's a lot of other factors that go into it, and we will discuss some of those.

that don't apply to Frank Peake, and we have discussed some of these. He was present at the start. Yes, for Baci; no, for Peake. And we go down the list here. Responsible for pricing and bunker fuel surcharge. Used the throwaway phones. Used secret e-mail. Managed the conspiracy on a daily basis. Communicated daily with his competitors. Coordinated bids and contracts. Created the conspiracy documents. And attempted to destroy evidence.

Your Honor, remember that when the raids happened,

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what was Baci doing? On the phone telling people to get rid of the e-mails. So, yes, there are a lot of aggravating factors for Baci that don't apply to Mr. Peake.

Same with Serra. A lot of aggravating factors regarding Serra. He was present at the start of the conspiracy. He signed the conspiracy contract. He was the one who did the 50/50 contract with Shapiro. He was the one who attended meetings in Dallas and Charlotte. No Frank Peake. He was responsible for pricing. He instructed employees to keep the conspiracy secret. He recruited others into the conspiracy and he lied to the FBI. None of these true for Frank.

Your Honor, here's the jury's opinion. I know the Court issued that order yesterday, but I have to tell you, I wish I would have had the chance to address the Court before that order came out because I disagree just about as strongly with that order as I disagreed in this case.

THE COURT: So we agree to disagree.

MR. MARKUS: We agree to disagree, Your Honor, but I would like to be heard on it. Because I think this is an important --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. MARKUS: I said this before, a juror taking the time to write two letters to the Court obviously feels strongly about the case. You know, one of the factors that

1 the 3553 in the cases talk about is sort of a voice to the 2 community, giving a voice to the community. Well, here's a 3 person in Puerto Rico who actually listened to the evidence, 4 and who has strong feelings about the punishment, but not 5 just the punishment, Your Honor, not just the punishment, but the relative role in the offense. And the juror has 6 7 written two letters and given comments. I assume it was the same juror. It may have been a different juror. 8 9 THE COURT: No, no. I think this is the -- I 10 don't know. It was a foreperson and one was not. 11 MR. MARKUS: Another juror --12 THE COURT: It is the same man. Same man. It is 13 the same person, foreperson. 14 MR. MARKUS: Well, what they say is: "While Peake 15 was a participant, he seemed to be more of an occasional 16 problem solver than a vital part of the conspiracy on a 17 day-to-day basis. He didn't stop it because all the 18 companies involved in the trade were doing it. I don't 19 believe he deserves the same punishment." 20 And I think, Your Honor, those comments can be 21 taken into account by the Court, not just on punishment 2.2 issues but on role in the offense and 3553 as a voice of the 23 community. 24 What about the sentences issued by Judge Corrigan,

because we heard a lot --

25

THE COURT: Judge who?

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MR. MARKUS: Judge Corrigan in the middle district. He is the judge on Baci and Serra, Your Honor. And, you know, the Government in this case did not allow him to consider the other 3553 factors in the case. And so what he said at the sentencing was: "The Court usually can consider such things as history and characteristics of the person, whether or not the person is likely to repeat the crime or not, specific deterrence as to the person. But I won't be considering any of that today. The only thing I will be considering today is the nature and value of the cooperation that each person provided to the Government."

So Your Honor isn't bound by those things that

Judge Corrigan was bound by, and Judge Corrigan was upset by

it, Your Honor. He told the Department of Justice that he

felt snookered in giving the highest sentence ever. He was

unhappy about giving that 48-month sentence because the

Department of Justice, it wasn't these prosecutors, it was

another prosecutor that has since left the office, told

Judge Corrigan that these sentences -- it turned off on me.

THE COURT: We are trying to put it back on for you. There it is.

MR. MARKUS: So what he said was that he asked a direct question about whether or not these sentences were in line with other antitrust cases, and he was told that they

were.

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You know, Your Honor, and now what we're hearing is, well, since this judge issued that sentence, this is sort of the new normal. But this judge wasn't told the truth about what the average antitrust sentence was. And he felt that the Department of Justice should have done that. He says that he was told by the Department of Justice that he was giving Mr. Baci the longest jail term ever imposed for a single antitrust violation. He wasn't told about this.

And so what does the First Circuit say? The First Circuit says that there has -- the aim in sentencing is a national uniformity focusing upon the common standard and looking at how most cases of the same kind were treated. That's what the First Circuit has consistently said about sentencing.

So what do we see about average sentences in antitrust cases? They are nowhere near the monster sentence that they are asking for here. They are asking for a sentence — in 2004, the average sentence was 15 months for someone in criminal history Category 1 like Mr. Peake. The median sentence was 12 months. They are asking — that's one year. They are asking for over seven years, Your Honor. Seven times higher than the average sentence. It is not right. You don't get seven times the sentence because you

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go to trial, and even, by the way, for people who do go to trial, Your Honor.

The AUO case, on the next slide. This was a recent case in San Francisco where the volume of commerce was \$2.3 billion with a "B." These prosecutors told the judge it was the worst antitrust case in the history of antitrust sentences. They didn't just ask for seven years in that case, they asked for ten years, the maximum sentence. They told the judge in San Francisco, "Give the guy ten years."

So they said they want to compare apples to apples. They asked for more than they are asking for Frank Peake. And you know what the judge said? "No way. That's unreasonable. You guys are trying to make a new normal here where the antitrust sentences are off the charts, and it is not going to fly."

So what happened? They asked for ten years. The most serious price fixing cartel ever prosecuted by the United States. That's what they told the judge. And what did Judge Illston say? She said no. She gave 36 months to the top executives. And she said: "The defendants thought they were doing the right thing vis-a-vis their industries and their companies. They weren't, but that's what they thought at the time. I don't mean to suggest they didn't know it was illegal. I think they did know it was illegal,

1 but there were a lot of business pressures that they were 2 responding to, and that's what they did. These were poor 3 choices, it was bad judgment. There was relatively little 4 personal motivation." 5 And then she compares and contrasts to mail fraud and other fraud cases where they are smaller dollar amounts, 6 7 but --8 THE COURT: Can we really say that there was 9 relatively little personal motivation when the bonuses were 10 going up? 11 MR. MARKUS: Same in this case, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Am I being snookered? No, right? 13 MR. MARKUS: No, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Fine. 15 MR. MARKUS: No. In fact, that's the whole point 16 here, is that Mr. Peake's salary wasn't changed by this 17 case. In fact, Your Honor pointed out at trial, the bonuses 18 were relatively modest compared to what the company was 19 making. These weren't big bonuses. And, in fact, the 20 bonuses were less because he took part of the profits and 21 reinvested them. 2.2 Your Honor, in 2007, his bonus was less than 23 \$90,000. Every year his bonus went down, 2006 to 2007 to 2008, his bonuses went down, from 145 to 90 to 45,000. His 24 25 salary remained constant at about 230,000.

1 THE COURT: Yes. But during the years that there 2 was no conspiracy, or very little conspiracy, he didn't have 3 those types of bonus. 4 MR. SNYDER: He wasn't there, Your Honor. 5 wasn't at the company before the conspiracy. He didn't start the conspiracy. He wasn't there before the 6 7 conspiracy. They offered him --THE COURT: He was there in 2003, right? 8 9 MR. MARKUS: Yes. The conspiracy started in 2002, 10 and he was offered --11 THE COURT: Do we have the bonuses? 12 MR. MARKUS: We have them from 2005, 2006, 2007 --13 MR. SNYDER: We may have them from an earlier 14 time, but I think we were limited in the years we could put 15 in. I can't remember the answer to that. He certainly 16 would have gotten them in 2004, 2005. I don't remember 17 2003, if the company was profitable. 18 MR. MARKUS: Your Honor, just one point about it 19 is the bonuses were much less than it could have been 20 because Frank Peake reinvested the profits into the port of 21 Puerto Rico. So those took away from the profitability of 2.2 the company, and his bonuses were less than they otherwise 23 could have been. By the way, no difference than the AUO 24 case where the executives there were making money. The 25 point is that they weren't stealing money and putting it in

their pockets.

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So how do Judge Illston's comments compare here?

They compare with exact accuracy. He was trying to do the right thing versus his industry and his company, that's what we have heard about in the letters that Ms. Moss talked about. A lot of business pressures, we heard that the companies were all losing money and going to go under before this happened. He invested 72 million in capital improvements for Sea Star and the port. And he didn't receive kickbacks, launder money, embezzle, any of those things that we see typically as hallmarks of the fraud case.

By the way, Peter Baci says the same thing. Here's Peter Baci, Your Honor.

(WHEREUPON, a video was played, with audio as follows:)

VOICE 1: The competitive nature and the profitability of not only Sea Star, but all the other companies involved in the shipping from Puerto Rico to Jacksonville.

VOICE 2: Well, in 1998 when Sea Star came into the marketplace, the market can best be described as being overtonnaged, where rather supply of container capacity far exceeded the requirements to ship goods back and forth to Puerto Rico. So it drove a pricing decline. Ships were running around at about maybe 60 percent of their capacity,

it was too much capacity, and the prices were dropping every day.

We estimated that the year 2000 or 2001, that the five carriers in that trade lost a collective hundred million dollars on revenues that might have been 800 million dollars. So it was a bloodbath. Everybody was losing money, nobody was making enough money to reinvest in the business. It was just -- it was a disaster.

(Video ended.)

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MR. MARKUS: We hear from Peter Baci as well about the state of the industry and why those volume of commerce numbers that the prosecutor is pounding on really overstate the culpability in the case.

There are other cases, of course. I know

Your Honor pointed out earlier in this proceeding that New

York in the Second Circuit are cases that Your Honor looks

to sometimes as persuasive. Here's another bid rigging case

where the guidelines, because there was mail fraud involved,

had guidelines close to 20 years, because they were the

product of greed and arrogance, according to the

prosecution. In fact, the defendants even received

kickbacks, and the defendant's businesses were affected by

these crimes.

And so what happened in this case? Judge Wood issued sentences way below the guidelines, and people still

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plead guilty, people aren't rushing to go to trial because of it, trials have decreased every year. And you see the sentences there. 18 months, 27 months, 16 months, way under the guidelines.

It is okay to sentence under the guidelines,
Your Honor. There's no presumption that a guideline
sentence is appropriate.

Other antitrust cases. Here's the automotive case. This case, Eric Holder said in late September that it is the largest investigation the antitrust division has ever pursued, over \$5 billion in commerce.

You can see some of the other factors there on that case. And some of the sentences, 12 months, 14 months, for some of the top executives.

Now, those cases are a little different because those two individuals didn't go to trial. So we have to look at similarly situated defendants in other cartels. Why should we look in other cartels even though Mr. Snyder says we shouldn't? The person formally in his position said we should. Scott Hammond said that we should look to similarly situated defendants in other cartels to be proportionate.

Why should we be proportionate? Because that's what the guidelines say we should strive to be. Give proportionate sentences. It is one of the main goals of 3553. And, by the way, Your Honor, one of the reasons you

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should consider the juror's note, the juror in his letter is talking about proportionality. The juror heard the evidence about Baci and Serra. The juror absolutely -- and I take exception to Your Honor's order. The juror did know about acceptance of responsibility. The juror did know about cooperation. There was extensive testimony that they got credit for those things.

THE COURT: They may have forgotten it when they wrote the letter.

MR. MARKUS: Judge, the jury listened to the evidence, and they came to a conclusion about who was the most culpable and who deserved the most punishment and didn't --

THE COURT: But that's not the role. The role is over here.

MR. MARKUS: Absolutely. It is something the Court is to consider under the proportionality under 3553, Your Honor.

And so if we want to be proportionate, and we want to look at the most egregious cases after trial, here's examples of the AUO case with the same prosecutors where they asked for ten years, getting three years and two years of the New York case. There have been 72 defendants sentenced between 2006 and 2011, Your Honor. 72 antitrust defendants. 60 of those defendants have gotten under the

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been doing in these antitrust cases. They have not listened to these requests for ten years, for seven years. These requests that the prosecutors are trying to do, by the way, to discourage trials. There aren't going to be many left. That's what our country was founded on, Your Honor.

What about the First Circuit? What does the First Circuit say about big variances, Your Honor? The First Circuit says you absolutely have the discretion to do it.

And in a similar case just last year in United States vs.

Prosperi, the district Judge Stearns went down from 87 months to probation. 18 months of probation, and talked about how the loss amount overstated the culpability, talked about the motivation was for seeing the company succeed just like Peter Baci talked about.

Your Honor, even if the guidelines, and we disagree with the prosecutors about this, but even if the guidelines don't take into account the reasonableness of the sentence, the Court can still take that into account. And you know what I haven't heard from the prosecutors today? Anything to rebut what Baci and Serra said about the prices being unreasonably low before the conspiracy started and that customers weren't cheated from the conspiracy. And that is something the Court can consider under 3553. The guidelines overstate culpability here.

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And the First Circuit, Your Honor, affirms variances like the one we are asking for. Because Frank Peake is just like the defendants in Prosperi. Just like the defendants in Prosperi, Your Honor.

I am going to skip over the next slide here because I know I am sort of using up too much of my time. I am getting close to the end, Your Honor.

This is Eric Holder, our Attorney General, who says that too many Americans go to too many prisons for far too long and for no good law enforcement reason. I can read it to you, but here he is himself saying it.

(WHEREUPON, the video was played, with audio, to wit:)

VOICE: It's clear as we come together today that too many Americans go to too many prisons for far too long, and for no truly good law enforcement reason. It is clear that at a very basic level, the 20th century criminal justice solutions are not adequate to overcome our 21st century challenges. And, again, it is well past time to implement commonsense changes that will foster safer communities from coast to coast. Today, and together, we must declare that we will no longer settle for such an unjust and unsustainable status quo. To do so would be to betray our history, our shared commitment to justice, and the founding principles of our nation. And this is our

1 solemn obligation as stewards of the law and servants of 2 those whom it protects and empowers, to open a frank and 3 constructive dialogue about the need to reform a broken 4 system, to fight for the sweeping systemic changes that we 5 need, and to uphold dearest values, as the ABA always has, by calling on our peers and colleagues, not merely to serve 6 7 their clients, nor to win their cases, but to ensure that in 8 every case, in every circumstance, and in every community, 9 justice is done. 10 (Video ended.) 11 MR. MARKUS: Your Honor, so even though --12 THE COURT: You know, you are one step ahead of 13 the Puerto Rican lawyers because they only give me the 14 transcript of that. 15 MR. MARKUS: I am trying, Judge. I am trying. 16 think it is powerful to hear the man say --17 THE COURT: I have heard that many times. You are 18 way ahead of them. 19 MR. MARKUS: He just said it this summer, and it 20 has been a constant theme. 21 THE COURT: I know. I have seen the transcript of 2.2 exactly that. 23 MR. MARKUS: And I think we even heard Mr. Snyder, sort of snuck out of him when he said that the guideline was 24 25 severe in this case. And, you know, he said, you know, even

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if you go under the guideline, it should be more than Baci.

I mean, I think we heard even from that, that a guideline sentence in this case is just not appropriate. So the question is how much lower should we go. And we have a big disagreement with the Government about how much lower it should go. They say it shouldn't go that much lower because the conspiracy could not have succeeded without Frank Peake. And I am just going to address a couple of the arguments that they say.

It did exist without Mr. Peake, Your Honor. It existed when Baci and Serra started it in 2002 without Frank Peake. It operated without him, it had the parameters without him. It was going. It was humming right along without Frank Peake. Baci ran the conspiracy, even under the Government's theory, without Frank Peake around. And even according to Baci, he only spoke to Peake every three months, at most.

They also say that the sentence should be higher than Baci's because Frank Peake could have stopped the conspiracy anytime. But that's true of any defendant that appears before you, right? Any defendant can call up the authorities and stop it or do whatever. That's not the point. The point is what is the relative culpability. All these other 3553 factors. And, again, I point to the jury and the other things we have said about here. But forget

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about that. The facts are that the conspiracy was humming along without Frank Peake.

In both their opening statement and their closing statement, they never said that Frank Peake was the mastermind of this conspiracy. They didn't use that word. I know Your Honor put that in the order. The Government doesn't even say that, Judge. The Government said he was an occasional problem solver. That's what the Government said, that's what the jury said. And if you believe the Government that he was an occasional problem solver, that's why he should get less than Peter Baci.

THE COURT: He is not the mastermind when he's not there. But he was the problem solver.

MR. MARKUS: That's different than being the mastermind, though, Your Honor. Peter Baci decided what customers to use, what rates to increase, set out the plan, did all these things. Peter Baci had a higher volume of commerce. Peter Baci obstructed justice. Peter Baci deserves a higher sentence than Frank Peake. Yes, Mr. Peake went to trial. So that factor doesn't apply to Baci, but Baci has all these other bad factors.

And so some of these we go through in this slide, and we have talked about them. The obstruction issues, the higher volume of commerce issues, the architects of the conspiracy. Those things apply to Baci and Serra. They do

1 not apply to Mr. Peake. 2 I know the prosecutors want you to disregard the jury sentencing recommendation. I know the Court has issued 3 4 the order. I point out that there is case law saying that 5 you have the discretion to consider it. I remind the Court the jurors are randomly selected from the Puerto Rican 6 7 community. We've made a big issue about how they were the victims in --8 9 THE COURT: You know, I really don't understand 10 The Court has the discretion to consider. Oh, yes, then. 11 the discretion. But not to follow it. It is not their job. 12 MR. MARKUS: No one is saying it is their job, Judge. No one's saying that they have the binding authority 13 14 on the Court. But the reason that --15 THE COURT: This is not a death penalty case. 16 There the jurors decide. 17 MR. MARKUS: Sometimes. Sometimes. 18 THE COURT: No, I think they always decide. 19 MR. MARKUS: In federal court. 20 THE COURT: But in state law, maybe, but here, in 21 federal court, it is the jury that decides death issues, not 2.2 the judge. 23 MR. MARKUS: But, Your Honor, one point that we raised before trial was that the case shouldn't be in Puerto 24 25 Rico because there was an issue with the jury being victims

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       of the crime. And you said, "You know what? I have faith,"
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       the Court said, "that the jury can put that aside and listen
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       objectively."
                 And here's the jury giving their opinions after
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       hearing this. And the prosecutors just want to sweep that
       aside. I think the Court can, doesn't have to say, "Okay,
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       well, just because the juror does it, I am going to do it."
       No, but you can consider it and give it some weight in
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       coming to your determination. These are jurors who listened
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       to the evidence, were victims according to the Government.
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       The Court said, no, they can listen and be fair. Here's
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       prosecutors telling them that their school lunch price
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       increased, and here they come back, and a juror
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       conscientiously tells the Court, strongly, two times,
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       Mr. Peake should get less than the real bad guys in the
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       case.
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                 THE COURT: So they didn't do a bad job in
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       weighing the evidence.
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                 MR. MARKUS: We disagree with the conclusion that
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       they came out on guilt.
                 THE COURT: But you like the --
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                 MR. MARKUS: Well, listen. If you are going to
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       take -- the Government can't have it both ways. And the
       Court --
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                 THE COURT: You can't have it both ways either.
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like this.

Case 3:11-cr-00512-DRD Document 235 Filed 01/10/14 Page 94 of 122 MR. MARKUS: Well, we are stuck with the verdict. We are going to appeal it because we disagree. We are stuck with the verdict, but we are saying, if the Court is going to accept the verdict, let's listen to what the jurors have to say about it. Let's listen to what the jurors have to say about it, because it goes to the 3553 factors. So what is a reasonable sentence for Mr. Peake? We contend that his involvement for the reasons that we have stated is much less than the other players. I know I have beaten this horse dead, but the juror recognized his lesser involvement. Ms. Moss talked about how he is respected, a good man, and I don't think that's at all been undercut by any witness from the Government. The Government hasn't even called one victim to testify here at sentencing, Your Honor. None of them have submitted letters to the Court or anything

THE COURT: The United States is totally satisfied that the victims have had their day and are still having their day in the civil case, where they have been remunerated.

MR. MARKUS: Okay.

THE COURT: That's what the argument is. That's what the other side of the coin is.

MR. MARKUS: Right. This is Mr. Peake's day, Your Honor, and so, you know, our position is that you have

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to look at his background, his characteristics, and, you know, he should not be sentenced to the highest sentence ever in antitrust history by almost double. I don't think Your Honor wants that on his record, I don't think Mr. Peake deserves that on his.

What's a sufficient but not greater than sentence that's necessary in this case, Your Honor? I am asking for a nonjail time sentence. Just like the Prosperi judge did, that was affirmed by the First Circuit. I believe that community service with house arrest and the \$20,000 fine would serve the community, would serve all of the 3553 factors in this case. He should get a lower sentence than Baci and Serra. Putting him in jail for a couple of years isn't going to do anybody any good. It is not going to decrease trials like the prosecutor is saying. It is not going to do any of these sorts of things. In fact, studies have shown that sentencing has almost no effect on deterrence, especially a federal sentence like this.

THE COURT: You know, these cases are kind of difficult to prosecute if you don't have cooperators. So a sentence below the cooperators' is a difficult sentence. It is a very difficult sentence because you know very well that without these witnesses, it is very difficult to try these types of cases.

MR. MARKUS: The Government told you themselves --

1 THE COURT: Because there is no agreement, 2 although in this case there was one, but not as to him. 3 MR. MARKUS: Prosecutors told you they didn't need 4 the cooperators. They had the e-mails long before the 5 cooperators were around. So I disagree with the Court. They told you a couple minutes ago that the cooperators 6 7 didn't help them all that much and they didn't need them in this particular case. 8 9 So I disagree with the Court. And I disagree that 10 if Your Honor gives Mr. Peake a lower sentence, that people 11 are going to say, "Let's go to trial." There are factors 12 here. He didn't get obstruction of justice. He didn't get the same volume of commerce numbers. He wasn't the 13 14 architect of the conspiracy. They can't just compare half 15 of the apple. If they want to compare apples to apples, 16 they have to look at all of those factors, Your Honor. The 17 jury, the voice of the Puerto Rican community told us what 18 was appropriate in this case. 19 They are not binding, but that is something that 20 is very powerful. I don't know if the Court has ever had a 21 juror, a foreperson of a jury send two letters to the Court. 2.2 THE COURT: No, I haven't. 23 MR. MARKUS: So I think that's a unique 24 circumstance about proportionality that can be considered. 25 Is it an easy thing to do, Your Honor? No. What I am

asking you to do is not an easy thing to do, but it is the right thing to do.

I am asking the Court to do the right thing for Mr. Peake. You are in that chair because it is not always easy to do what you have to do, Your Honor. It is not easy to sentence. It is not easy, especially in a case like this. But the right thing to do in this case is to give Mr. Peake under Baci and Serra. The jury knew it, the factors all point to it under 3553, and I am asking the Court to do the right thing here.

Thank you.

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THE COURT: United States?

MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, there's a lot I could say in response, but I will try to limit myself to three quick points.

First, Frank Peake does deserve a sentence that's higher than his subordinate who accepted responsibility five years ago. And it just so happens that it will happen to be the longest sentence. But that's not why we are here.

Let me first address the LCD sentences, the AUO sentences. In LCD -- well, let me do a timeline for you.

April 2008, FBI searches Sea Star, Horizon, Crowley. That fall, five individuals plead guilty and receive the sentences that Your Honor is familiar with, including Peter Baci of 48 months, Gabe Serra, 34 months.

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Fast forward now to 2012. AUO executives are convicted, the United States asks for longer sentences. They asked for statutory max sentences to the two senior-most executives. Having been one of the prosecutors on that case, they were asked for at the direction of first the deputy assistant Attorney General, who is referenced in Mr. Peake's PowerPoint. And the Government sought those sentences because they believed they were justified in that case, and they were actually below guideline sentences because ten years — the guidelines were about ten years, and ten years is the statutory max. That case, the judge didn't agree that that was an appropriate sentence and sentenced them to 36 months.

Fast forward several more months. Mr. Peake is convicted and now is facing sentencing. How perverse would the result be if Mr. Baci, Mr. Serra, Mr. Gill, all got the sentences they got, but Mr. Peake by waiting, by not cooperating, not accepting responsibility, letting years of the investigation go by as the Government's investigating Puerto Rico and investigating other jurisdictions that were under investigation, other trade lines that were under investigation, goes through trial and now can say, "Hey, because another judge in another case sentenced people who were arguably worse than me, to less, therefore, I can get to rely on those sentences." What does that say? How does

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that incentivize cooperation? How does that incentivize somebody to take responsibility. How is that fair to Mr. Baci, Mr. Serra, Mr. Gill, who all recognize what they did, and pled guilty.

It wouldn't be. It would be the absolute opposite. It would disincentivize cooperation, and that is something that the cases uniformly say you should take into account in considering whether a higher sentence for somebody who doesn't plead guilty is a sentencing disparity. Those cases hold that it isn't. And that's why AUO is an outlier on a number of different grounds.

It just was a different investigation. Those executives received two and a half times -- those 36-month sentences represented two and a half times the sentence received by the highest level cooperator at 14 months.

As we noted in our papers, if Mr. Peake were to receive a sentence two and a half times larger than Mr. Baci, he would be right at 120 months, the statutory max. Of course, we are not asking for that.

But to say that Mr. Peake should get the benefit of now being able to point to sentences handed down after his coconspirators pled guilty and accepted responsibility, it would be an absolute incentive not to cooperate or accept responsibility.

Mr. Markus said we haven't said the rates were

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unreasonable. One, the case law doesn't require it. And, two, I think we can let the MDL speak for itself. The MDL was full of people suing because they believed the rates that they had been charged were unreasonable.

So I think it seems that the Government -- it seems a little too obvious to even have to state. The Government believes the rates were unreasonable. The proof is in the MDL pudding, and litigation that continues to go on and on and on of victims who were victimized by this conspiracy and are seeking recovery.

Finally, with respect to the juror letter. I will leave it with this: Where are the other 11 letters? Where are all these other jurors that we keep hearing about who, by God, they wouldn't have convicted but for if they had known? You haven't seen any of those letters. You have letters from one juror who clearly hesitated to even cast a guilty verdict to begin with, and is very clear on the face of his letter, and under rule 608(b), this is precisely the reason we are not permitted to consider the internal workings of the jury deliberation room in deciding whether a new trial is appropriate or certainly in considering the proprietary of the sentence where, of course, the jurors have no understanding of the guidelines and the different factors that Your Honor is supposed to consider in deciding a reasonable sentence.

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                 That's all I have, Your Honor. Thank you.
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                 THE COURT: The Court recesses.
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                 (WHEREUPON, a recess was had from 4:16 p.m. to
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       4:59 p.m.)
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                 THE COURT: Okay. Is there any reason why the
       Court should not at this time pronounce sentence?
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 7
                 MR. MARKUS: No.
                 THE COURT: The defendant will move with both
 8
 9
       counsel to the front, please.
10
                 On January 29, 2013, defendant Frank Peake was
11
       found guilty of Count 1 of the indictment in criminal case
12
       number 11-512, which charges a violation of Title 15, USC,
       Section 1, a Class C felony, conspiracy to suppress and
13
14
       eliminate competition by agreeing to fix rates and
15
       surcharges for Puerto Rico freight services.
16
                 The November 1, 2013 edition of the United States
17
       sentencing guidelines, which is the same as the guideline of
18
       November of 2007, has been used to apply the guideline
19
       adjustments pursuant to the provisions of guideline
20
       1B1.11(a). Based on the provisions of guideline 2R1.1(a), a
21
       base offense level of 12 has been determined, as Mr. Peake
2.2
       was found quilty of price fixing. Because Mr. Peake agreed
23
       to submit noncompetitive bids, an additional level is
       warranted pursuant to guideline section 2R1.1(b)(1). Since
24
25
       the volume of commerce attributed to Mr. Peake was more than
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2.2

500 million, a 12 level increase is authorized pursuant to quideline section 2R1.1(b)(2)(F).

It is the Court's opinion that notwithstanding the exempt status of certain cargo pointed out by the defense, the Court is of the opinion that all this cargo was contaminated by the bunker fuel incorporation antitrust agreement into the rate.

Because Mr. Peake was a chief executive officer of Sea Star, who had the authority over other employees participating in the conspiracy, he acted as a leader, negotiator, and ultimate decision maker in the criminal activity that involved five or more participants, 4 levels are added pursuant to guideline 3B1.1(a).

The slides produced in the defense presentation, which is going to move the Court to provide a variance, also showed that there was more than four persons in the conspiracy. I refer to page 7, where at least five persons are alleged to have participated in the conspiracy, and with Mr. Peake it would be six.

Based on a total offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of 1, the guideline imprisonment range for this offense is from 87 to 108 months, a fine of \$20,000 to \$1 million, plus a supervised release term of at least one year, and not more than three years.

The Court has reviewed the advisory guideline

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calculations, and finds that the pre-sentence investigation report has adequately applied the guideline computations, and that it satisfactorily reflects the component of this offense by considering its nature and circumstances. The Court has also considered the other sentencing factors set forth in Title 21 USC.

Mr. Frank Peake is a 51-year-old man with a bachelors degree in accounting and a masters degree in business administration. He has a history of formal employment in the shipping industry, specifically, Mr. Peake worked as a manager, a vice president, and president of Sea Land Corporation, Sea CSX Line, Sea Star, and American Shipping Group.

During all that time there's absolutely no evidence that there was any violation of -- other than his time in this conspiracy, to any maritime law or any other business related law or any personal criminal violation.

Mr. Peake has no history of substance abuse, but admits to consumption of alcohol in excess, which the Court will provide him the 500 hours of intensive alcohol treatment, which may warrant that his sentence be reduced one year should he comply. But that determination is not under the control of the Court.

In regards to the offense, however, Mr. Peake played a critical role in the success of the conspiracy. He

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approved his subordinates' illegal conduct and directly participated in many key price-fixing meetings and communications, and they are all well expressed at pages 6 and 7 of the United States sentencing memorandum. I have counted at least 5 critical events, which I have placed under the Rule 29 opinion, and now incorporate under my sentencing conclusions in this case.

The Court also amends its opinion by stating that he is the mastermind, that the word "mastermind" is wrongly placed. He is not "the mastermind," but he is a critical person in the successful operation of the scheme since July 2005 to the date the conspiracy ended in April.

He did receive training in antitrust relations and could have put a stop to the conspiracy at any time.

Instead, he allowed it to continue and took the lead in several aspects because he was benefiting indirectly by the bonus compensation which he was receiving.

The Court has also considered the negative impact the conspiracy had on business in Puerto Rico. The conspiracy succeeded in raising all components of the prices because the vast majority of the transportation industry was affected. 85 percent, pursuant to testimony of Mr. Baci. The customers, therefore, found that shipping rates increased significantly every year, but they had no other alternative.

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The Court recognizes that when Mr. Peake entered into the conspiracy, there was a severe pressure on him to have the company and the industry succeed as the industry and the companies were having serious economic difficulties. However, the saving of the maritime industry affected all the transportation costs of the industry, up to, as I stated before, 85 percent.

Although there were no kickbacks nor under-the-table payments, Mr. Peake did receive considerable bonuses, which increased his salary significantly during his participation in the conspiracy.

Before finishing this part of the opinion, however, the Court must analyze a potential disparity in sentence between the defendant and Mr. Baci. The Court knows that Mr. Baci was sentenced to 48 months, which would mean a sentence at level 22. But his volume of commerce is 2 points higher than the volume of Mr. Peake, as Mr. Baci received apparently a 14 point assessment under the volume of business as he was in the conspiracy for a longer period. Further, Mr. Baci had 2 points placed on him due to obstruction of justice.

However, the Court, upon reading the pre-sentence report, finds that Mr. Peake was not entirely truthful, as in his first interviews with the FBI he denied any participation whatsoever in his initial interviews. He

2.2

eventually provided a veiled acceptance of having some participation. Therefore, the Court understands that there is only a difference of 1 point in this last mentioned respect between Mr. Baci and Mr. Peake.

Now, however, if the Court places now Mr. Peake at level 19 to equate him with Mr. Baci, the Court must also then proceed to add to Mr. Peake, in order to put him at the same level of Baci, we have to add to him 6 points; 3 points for acceptance of responsibility, and at least 3 points for the assistance in prosecution which was granted to Mr. Baci.

However, Mr. Peake warrants, in the opinion of the Court, consideration for his personal characteristics outside the business pressure, which contributed to his participation in the conspiracy.

Therefore, the Court ends at a level 24, and, therefore, grants a 1 level mitigation. This means that his potential sentence is between 51 and 63. But the Court must also make a differential between Baci and Peake because of the fact that, obviously, Peake was over Baci, and Peake particularly had the ability to solve problems when Baci and his equal codefendant in other companies did not have an agreement.

Therefore, it is the finding of this Court that Mr. Peake is to be sentenced to 60 months. It is also the judgment of the Court that Mr. Frank Peake is to be fined

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\$25,000 to be paid forthwith. Upon release from confinement Mr. Peake shall be placed on supervised release for a term of three years, to be served under the following terms and conditions:

He shall observe the standard conditions of supervised release recommended by the United States Sentencing Commission and adopted by this Court.

He shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime.

He shall not possess firearms, destructive devices, or other dangerous weapons.

He shall not possess controlled substances unlawfully.

He shall not use liquor excessively, and shall submit to alcohol tests within 15 days of release from imprisonment. After his release, Mr. Peake shall submit to random alcohol testing, not less than three samples during the supervised period, but not to exceed 104 samples per year, in accordance with the drug aftercare program policy of the United States Probation Office, which includes alcohol, and has been approved by this Court.

If substance abuse or drugs is detected in any sample, Mr. Peake shall participate in an inpatient or outpatient substance abuse treatment program for evaluation or treatment as arranged by the United States Probation

1 Office based on his ability to pay or ability of payment by 2 third parties as approved by the Court. 3 He shall participate in vocational training or job 4 placement program as recommended by the United States 5 probation officer. He shall provide the probation officer access to any financial information. 6 7 Upon request, he shall cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample as directed by the probation officer, 8 9 pursuant to the revised DNA collection requirements and 10 Title 18, US Code, Section 3563(a)(9). 11 The defendant shall perform 250 hours of community 12 service as monitored by the United States probation officer 13 in a nonprofit organization. 14 A special monetary assessment in the amount of 15 \$100 is imposed as required by law. 16 Has that been paid, Mr. Markus? 17 MR. MARKUS: The \$100, not yet, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Okay. The Court grants him ten days 19 to pay that. 20 MR. MARKUS: Thank you. 21 THE COURT: I think he has ability to pay. 2.2 The defendant is ordered under 3553, 18 USC 23 3553(a)(2)(D), he is ordered to receive from the Bureau of 24 Prisons while under custody the 500 hours for alcohol abuse. 25 Under this program, sir, you are entitled to up to one year

1 reduction in sentence if you pass the alcohol test, which is 2 given separately than the drug testing. This is separate 3 within the same program. The Court understands that the 4 Court is warranted to issue this order under paragraph 75 5 and 77 of the pre-sentence report. After sentencing reminder: You have a right to 6 7 appeal this sentence since you have been found guilty after a plea of not guilty under federal rule of criminal 8 9 procedure 32(a)(2). 10 Notice of appeal shall be filed in the district of 11 Puerto Rico within 14 days from today when the judgment of the Court will be entered. 12 Under rule 4(b), you have a right to apply for 13 14 leave to appeal in forma pauperis if you are unable to pay 15 the cost of an appeal under federal rule 32(a)(2). 16 If you are represented by court-appointed counsel, 17 he or she will continue. But you are not. You are 18 represented by counsel of your choice. 19 You will be given credit toward your sentence for 20 any day spent in federal custody. 21 Did he spend any time under federal custody? 2.2 MR. MARKUS: One day, Judge. 23 THE COURT: That's not too much of a credit, but a 24 credit of one day is ordered. 25 In connection with the offense for which the

1 sentence has been imposed, the Court allows you to remain 2 under the same bail conditions. However, the Court orders 3 that the drug testing -- the alcohol testing is to be made 4 in the district that you are residing in. 5 The Court does not want further DUIs on your part, and if you do and the matter is repeated, you could have 6 7 your bail revoked. 8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: All right. That ends the matter, 10 gentlemen. 11 MR. MARKUS: Your Honor, if --12 THE COURT: What the Court has done is equate him 13 to Baci, in a way equate him to Baci, because the Court 14 understands that, yes, Baci was the day-to-day officer, but 15 on the other hand, this gentleman was the gentleman that 16 could resolve all the problems that were occurring between 17 Baci and his codefendants of the same level of Baci. And, 18 hence, the Court understands that he participated in at 19 least five events, which are correctly and very well 20 narrated by the United States at pages 6 and 7 of their 21 sentencing memorandum. 2.2 Yes, Mr. Markus? 23 MR. MARKUS: Yes, Your Honor. Obviously, I 24 preserve and re-raise all our previous objections and 25 arguments.

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                 I would like to ask for a recommendation that if
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       after the appeal the conviction and sentence is affirmed,
 3
       that Mr. Peake be able to do his sentence at Fort Dix, which
 4
       is close to his home.
 5
                 THE COURT: Well, you are coming back here. I
       think you are coming back. But fine.
 6
 7
                MR. MARKUS: There's been a judgment.
                 THE COURT: You have to come back for the
 8
 9
       judgment. And then I will recommend the place where he
10
       goes. All right. That's what I will do.
11
                MR. MARKUS: I think if Your Honor issues a JNC
12
      today, so that we can appeal from it, we would just ask
13
      that --
14
                 THE COURT: Fine. Fine. Yes. I will do it.
15
      Yes. I don't want to delay the appeal. You are right.
16
                 The Court authorizes that he serve his sentence at
17
      Fort Dix, New Jersey.
18
                MR. MARKUS: Yes, Your Honor.
19
                 THE COURT: Okay. That's where it is. Fort Dix,
20
      New Jersey. Although I want to advise you that the best
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       custodial place to serve white collar crime where there's no
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      violence, where you may have been induced to crime due to
       some circumstances is not in Fort Dix, but it is in Florida.
23
24
                MR. MARKUS: There's --
25
                 THE COURT: But the time has not arrived yet. I
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1 have issued the order to the preference you have requested. 2 MR. MARKUS: Yes, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Study it, because there is a place in 4 Florida where persons serving white collar crimes in Puerto 5 Rico have been sent. There are no bars. There's a door that shuts down for everybody, but there are no bars, 6 7 there's a yellow line where they can't pass, and they have total liberty during the entire day. 8 9 MR. MARKUS: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 The only other request I would make is if in the 11 event the conviction and sentence are affirmed, Mr. Peake 12 have 45 days or something like this to surrender or come back to the Court so that he doesn't have to -- there's no 13 14 issue about him having to report that very day or not. 15 THE COURT: No. No. 16 What the Court will do is we will allow him 45 17 days to surrender. 18 MR. MARKUS: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: That's also part of the sentence. 20 Good luck, Mr. Peake. 21 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor. 2.2 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Surrender where? 23 THE COURT: He will surrender, if he surrenders, 24 he surrenders to Fort Dix, New Jersey, when the Bureau 25 states the date. And the Court will state the date, if it

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       is ahead of 45 days.
2
                 Mr. Snyder, anything from you?
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                 MR. SNYDER: No, Your Honor.
 4
                 THE COURT: Perhaps you think I have been too
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       lenient.
                 MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, I believe the sentence is
 6
7
       entirely appropriate for the case.
                 THE COURT: All right. Well, somehow I get the
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 9
       impression that you both don't like the sentence.
10
                 The Court enters into the record the presentation
11
       by counsel in slides, which was presented to the Court and
12
       which the Court used only to establish that there were more
13
       than four persons in the conspiracy.
14
                 Any objection thereto? Mr. Markus?
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                 MR. MARKUS: To making that part of the record?
16
       No.
17
                 THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Markus, I don't know
18
       how much time you have to catch your plane, but get out of
19
       here.
20
                 MR. MARKUS: I think we are going to try to catch
21
       the later flight, Judge.
2.2
                 THE COURT: Okay.
23
                 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Judge, the allocution?
24
                 THE COURT: Oh, hold it. I don't want to make
25
       this sentence illegal.
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1
                 Sir, you are entitled to make an allocution.
2
       did not make an allocution.
 3
                 MR. MARKUS: Judge, may I have a moment?
                 THE COURT: Yes.
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 5
                 (Short pause while the defendant and his counsel
       conferred.)
 6
 7
                 THE DEFENDANT: No, thank you, Your Honor.
                 THE COURT: Sir, you are entitled to make an
 8
 9
       allocution. The allocution may sway the Court to sentence
10
      you lower or higher. It doesn't provide any guarantees, but
11
      you are entitled by law, and the sentence will be illegal if
12
      you are not entitled to make an allocution. But you are
13
      entitled to waive it. And you are waiving it; is that
14
      right?
15
                 MR. MARKUS: Well, Judge, to be fair, I think the
16
      Court has determined what his sentence is. I mean, if
17
      Your Honor is telling me that you truly have an open mind
18
      about going lower --
19
                 THE COURT: Yes, I could have an open mind. But
20
      there's no quarantee. There's no quarantee.
21
                 MR. MARKUS: I know there's no guarantee, but --
2.2
                 THE COURT: There is no quarantee either way.
23
      Either way.
24
                 MR. MARKUS: Well --
25
                 THE COURT: I am granting you that opportunity.
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1
                 MR. MARKUS: Let me have a moment, Your Honor.
2
                 (Short pause while the defendant and his counsel
 3
       conferred.)
 4
                 MR. MARKUS: Mr. Peake was planning on addressing
 5
       the Court before the announcement of sentence, and he would
       still like to address the Court.
 6
 7
                 THE COURT: Very well. Okay.
                 MR. MARKUS: And I would ask the Court to keep an
 8
 9
       open mind about going a little lower, based on his
10
       statement.
11
                 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, first of all, thank
       you for giving me this opportunity. Can I use the ELMO?
12
13
                 THE COURT: You may.
14
                 THE DEFENDANT: What I wanted to do, Your Honor, I
15
       wanted to take this opportunity to introduce you to my
16
       children.
17
                 THE COURT: Let me say this, that your children, I
18
       saw them. They were illustrated precisely in the slide
19
       presentation.
20
                 THE DEFENDANT: That's why I put it back up there.
21
                 THE COURT: Okay.
2.2
                 THE DEFENDANT: I just wanted to talk to you a
       little bit about them.
23
24
                 THE COURT: Go ahead.
25
                 THE DEFENDANT: Because they really wanted to be
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2.2

here today. I was the one that told them no, and that, you know, they are in school, and they are working and doing a lot of things. But my oldest, Nicole, she said, can you at least tell the Judge about us. And so I said, yes, I will tell the Judge about you.

All three of my kids, that's Frankie, Megan, and Nicole, they are all teenagers. Nicole is 19, Frankie is 17, and Megan is 14. And I am sure Your Honor remembers back to when your girls were teenagers.

THE COURT: I have three girls. They were all teenagers.

THE DEFENDANT: What a challenging time that was. And in spite of those challenges, there is nothing on this earth that I love more than these three children, and I am sure Your Honor felt the same way about his girls.

The last two years have been difficult for me, but I think even more so for these three kids. I have since the day they were born, I have been their rock. I have read to them every night when they were young. I have become teacher and soccer coach and, you know, been to all their games, and been to all their recitals, and have been with them and become the one that they turned to the most when there are issues in their lives, and particularly now in the teenage years, there are lots of them. And they are all approaching the college age and things of that nature.

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The only reason I bring this up, Your Honor, is because while I understand that I perhaps need to be punished for my activities, I think the unfortunate consequence, and trust me, I don't short the blame on this, Your Honor, but the unfortunate consequence is these three kids that you see, and the challenges that they will face potentially without me for an extended period of time, particularly given the fact that their mother has been hospitalized now twice for nervous breakdowns in the past year. So, clearly, my biggest concern is not for myself. My biggest concern is for these three beautiful kids.

THE COURT: Well, as to that, I think your case is going to take two and a half years in federal court in Boston. This case, the record is enormous, and appeals are lasting in Boston between 18 to 24 months. So you will still have them for the next 24 months, from 18 to 24 months, all right.

Remember, the statement of the Court lasts until, as of now, lasts until the First Circuit decides. That was what I said. And I remind you that it did not include the Supreme Court. But that's not written in stone or in iron. Continue.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, again, because they couldn't be here to be with me today, I did want to at least give them their moment in the spotlight because they deserve

1 it, and they are challenging, they are teenagers, but all 2 three of them are just great kids. 3 THE COURT: Is that the allocution? THE DEFENDANT: That's it, Your Honor. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. The Court is sincere with you and advises you that the Court has taken that into 6 7 consideration already under two grounds. First, under the 8 ground that -- under the reasoning that I saw the 9 presentation being made, and, second, that I knew you were 10 not going to jail, and you will still have around 24 months, 11 which may be increased depending on what you state to the 12 Court about those three children. And it is important what the mother is doing. This is like a downward departure for 13 14 family reasons. 15 THE DEFENDANT: She's getting some psychological 16 assistance. 17 THE COURT: Fine. All right. So this is 18 something that the Court may revisit. I know you are not an 19 ardent criminal. You are not running around with machine 20 guns, but I do feel that the case of the United States was 21 strong. After evaluating it carefully, I think it was 2.2 strong. 23 By the way, Mr. Markus, I examined those two 24 cases, and none of those two cases have the words 25 "reasonable price." None of them. None of them. Those two

1 cases that I mentioned to you, that is the two cases the 2 Court mentioned to you -- there were really three. I found 3 that there were really three cases. They were the cases of 4 Giordano, and Andreas, and Hayter Oil Company, and none of 5 the three had the words "reasonable pricing." MR. MARKUS: But they do say "above market price." 6 7 THE COURT: They talk about market price, but not "reasonable." 8 9 MR. MARKUS: Well, Your Honor --10 THE COURT: Gentlemen, have a good flight home. 11 Mr. Markus, you are a big fighter and so is Mr. Snyder. 12 MR. MARKUS: Your Honor, I just want to say one thing based on the allocution, which is, Your Honor 13 14 calculated the guidelines, I know, obviously, we disagree 15 with them, but the guidelines that you calculated with 16 taking into account everything came out to 51 to 63 months. 17 I think listening to the man and seeing him, we would just 18 ask Your Honor to give the low end of 51 months. At that 19 point, it is still more than Baci, but it would make a 20 difference to Mr. Peake, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: I know it would be, we discussed it, 2.2 we discussed it thoroughly, but we thought that there had to 23 be a distinction with Mr. Baci because Mr. Baci went through 24 the procedure of timely accepting responsibility and going 25 through the pressure, that's like a pressure cooker of

1 sitting here and providing testimony against his good 2 friend. 3 THE DEFENDANT: He is not --4 MR. MARKUS: Okay. 5 THE COURT: Well, fine. Maybe he is no longer your good friend. But you worked together, and I saw his 6 7 face. It wasn't easy for him to testify, for none of those cooperators that came to testify, none of them were having 8 9 fun testifying here. There was one that even approached you 10 to give you his hand, and I don't blame you for not giving 11 your hand to him. But, you know, he went through a lot of 12 pressure to testify. Maybe he exaggerated, I don't know. He certainly went through -- he certainly suffered an 13 14 eloquent and diligent and hard cross-examination, all of 15 them, by two very competent lawyers. 16 So it is not easy to come in and testify against 17 persons that you have worked with and that they may have 18 admired you, yet they were as quilty as you as far as the 19 conviction is concerned. 20 Well, I don't think I will be seeing you again, 21 sir, because everything from here on can be performed in 2.2 writing, and I wish you good luck. You are still a young 23 man and you are going to come out a young man, and I wish 24 you good luck, sir. 25 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor.

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(WHEREUPON, at 5:35 p.m., the proceedings were
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       concluded.)
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1
       UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT )
                                        SS.
2
       OF PUERTO RICO
                                     )
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                           REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
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 7
 8
                 I, ANNETTE M. MONTALVO, do hereby certify that the
 9
       above and foregoing, consisting of the preceding 121 pages,
10
       constitutes a true and accurate transcript of my
11
       stenographic notes and is a full, true and complete
12
       transcript of the proceedings to the best of my ability.
13
                 Dated this 10th day of January, 2014.
14
15
                                     S/Annette M. Montalvo
                                Annette M. Montalvo, CSR, RDR
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                                Official Court Reporter
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